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Abstract 
White collar corporate corruption continues to be prevalent in the United States, costing 
shareholders billions of dollars annually. This study of the collapse of Coudersport, PA 
firm, Adelphia Communications, explored how and why leadership of this prominent 
andsuccessful company made unethical decisions, created an atmosphere of moral 
disengagement, and led to the downfall of the company. Taped interviews with 10 
executives who were employed at the company during the years of its rise and demise 
(1996–2006) were transcribed, hand coded, and analyzed to explore the ethical culture 
and leadership practices at Adelphia. These insights offer a possible explanation for the 
behavior that resulted in the collapse of the company. The theoretical framework for this 
qualitative case study included ethical work climate, moral cognitive theory, and the 
theory of moral disengagement. Results showed  that the collapse of Adelphia was 
enabled by intense family control,  low empowerment, and extreme greed and entitlement 
on the part of the founders who never made a clear business transition from being family-
owned to a publicly-traded corporation. Additionally, proper oversight by the board and 
outside auditors was lacking. These findings may contribute to positive social change in 
the areas of ethical training and in creating and operationalizing corporate values in day-
to-day decision making in the corporate environment.  These findings also suggest further 
need for new legislative issues beyond existing law to hold external consultants involved 
in fiduciary responsibility more accountable.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
 In the United States, corporate fraud has brought attention to the lack of fiscal 
accountability on Wall Street, yet few corporate leaders have been openly punished for 
the collapses of companies and the economic market (J. Cohen, Ding, Lesage, & 
Stolowy, 2010). As part of this study, I used early cognitive moral development theories 
(Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Piaget, 1971) to examine moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986, 
1999) and the foundations of ethical work climate (Victor & Cullen, 1987) to seek insight 
into how and why Adelphia Communications Corporation, the fifth largest cable 
company in the United States during the late 1990s (Healy & Fabri, 2000), went 
bankrupt. The problem statement, purpose, and nature of the study are presented in this 
chapter and the conceptual framework is proposed. The significance of the study and 
implications for social change are explained. 
Background 
Corporate values and codes of ethics are often overlooked in day-to-day decision 
making (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008; M. Moore, 2008). Proposed explanations for 
unethical decisions include: (a) lack of personal moral values (Bryant, 2009; Dean et al., 
2010), (b) insufficient education (Etzioni, 2002; Fang, 2006), (c) high stress levels at 
work (Selart & Johansen, 2010), (d) tainted corporate culture (Holian, 2002), (e)greed fed 
by corporate reward systems (Dean et al., 2010), (f) gender issues (Gilligan, 1982), (g) 
high ego/status (Galperin, Bennett, & Aquino, 2011), (h) inability to recognize ethical 
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issues (Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010), (i) the structure of the corporation as an 
entity (Bakan, 2004; Kelly, 2002), and (j) low personal cognitive moral development 
(Kihl, 2007; Kohlberg, 1984; White, Bandura, & Bero, 2009), among other variables.  
Very little practical research has been conducted on the collapse of specific 
companies resulting from unethical behavior and decisions within senior management. 
An in-depth look at one company provided contextual insight into the issues behind such 
a collapse. Interviewing senior managers at one company allowed deep investigation into 
the details of culture, personalities, executive directives, and decision making not 
available through a broader review of corporate collapse from a financial standpoint. 
Because the former executives of Adelphia were available for personal interviews, 
Adelphia was a worthwhile focus for this study. 
Moral disengagement was first posited by Bandura (1986), who remarked that 
unethical decisions are made when the personal moral compass that generally self-
regulates an individual is deactivated (M. Moore, 2008). Bandura argued that moral 
disengagement explains why seemingly moral people are able to behave in unethical 
ways without feeling guilty. Some researchers have made the correlation between moral 
disengagement and unethical decision making (Detert et al., 2008; M. Moore, 2008; 
Ntayi, Eyaa, & Ngoma, 2010; White et al., 2009), but evidence of that correlation in a 
practical real-life situation has been lacking, pointing to a gap in the knowledge base. A 
single-case study provided an opportunity to document and analyze the situation of a 
well-publicized case through the words and experiences of those who were employed at 
the company at the time of the fraud. Descriptive information gathered through 
interviews revealed information that helps explain how the organizational environment 
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and personalities of senior managers influenced the corrupt behavior that led to the end of 
Adelphia Communications. 
Adelphia was founded in 1952 by John Rigas, who purchased a small cable 
franchise in Coudersport, Pennsylvania for $300 (Healy & Fabri, 2000). The company 
grew and incorporated in 1972, eventually making an initial public offering in 1986 
(Healy & Fabri, 2000). By 1999, the company stock was traded as high as $87 per share, 
and company operations had expanded beyond the core cable business into a telephony 
business, a sports channel business, and a radio station (Adelphia Communications 
Corporation, n.d.). The Rigas family owned 77% of all voting rights; John Rigas was the 
chief executive officer and his sons, Tim, Michael, and James, and son-in-law Peter 
Venetis served as chief financial officer, vice president of operations, vice president of 
strategic planning, and head of the board of directors, respectively (Healy & Fabri, 2000). 
The Rigas family was well-known and had won awards for its outstanding 
achievements and contributions to the community and to the cable industry (L. R. 
Johnson & Rudolph, 2007).  Adelphia sales grew to over $300 million during the early 
1990s (Healy & Fabri, 2000). The company grew naturally, as well as through several 
major acquisitions; by 2000, their subscriber base included more than 5 million 
customers (Healy & Fabri, 2000). Debt increased as a result of these acquisitions and, in 
2002, the company disclosed $2.3 billion in previously undisclosed debt through co-
borrowings between the company and the family (Adelphia Communications corporate 
history, n.d.). That announcement proved to be the start of a financial downturn for the 
company because the Rigas family could not repay the debt and Adelphia was 
responsible for it (Healy & Fabri, 2000). An investigation into the financial dealings 
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indicated that the money borrowed by the family was used to fund such excesses as 
private airplanes, construction of a private golf course, and maintaining a personal staff 
including a chef. It was also discovered that the family had overstated cash flow, 
subscriber count, and sales numbers to make the company look more financially stable 
than it was (Mahony, 2005).  
The announcement of financial misdeeds triggered an SEC investigation, 
numerous shareholder lawsuits, the resignation of the entire family from the board of 
directors and their various operating roles in the company, the delisting of the stock, a 
bankruptcy filing, and ultimately the arrest and 20-year jail terms for John and Timothy 
Rigas (Healy & Fabri, 2000). In a period of approximately three years, a once highly 
regarded company was destroyed. Adelphia filed for bankruptcy in March 2002 
(Mahony, 2005) and the company no longer exists. Through the lens of those who 
worked at Adelphia during the time of these unprecedented events, this case study 
explores how and why such corruption prevailed and develops some suggestions as to 
how corporations might avoid similar scenarios in the future. 
Statement of the Problem 
Scandals involving unethical decisions in corporate America do not seem to be on 
the decline (Barsky, 2011; White et al., 2009). Corporate executives enrich themselves at 
the expense of their employees and shareholders, causing harm to individuals as well as 
to their companies; examples include: ImClone, WorldCom, Enron, and HealthSouth 
(Thompson, 2010). Corporate leaders, including Bernard Madoff, who was sentenced to 
150 years in prison and showed little, if any, remorse for his illegal actions (Wearden, 
2011), which destroyed businesses and individuals’ lives.  News Corporation, owned by 
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Rupert Murdoch, was undermined by unethical and illegal phone hacking among its 
journalists, triggering the resignation of several key employees and the demise of the 
168-year-old News of the World, the most widely read newspaper in London (Greene, 
2011).  
The focus of this research is on one company and sheds light on the dynamics 
involved in large-scale unethical behavior by asking, “Why did the leaders of Adelphia 
Communications make unethical decisions when so much was at stake?” Financial 
scandals such as the one that engulfed Adelphia expose organizational and leadership 
shortcomings (Bakan, 2004; Kuhn & Ashcroft, 2003). Corporate leaders at Adelphia 
willfully chose to cause financial harm to those who worked for them and benefitted from 
their own financial malfeasance, behaving without guilt or remorse (Dash, 2011; 
Horovitz, 2002; Samuelson, 2006). Why does this behavior happen? While much 
supposition has been made and research conducted on the possible causes of unethical 
decisions by senior leaders across industries (e.g., banking, education, law enforcement), 
and across specific functional areas (e.g., sales, marketing, finance), exploration of 
scholastic sources and business databases including EBSCOhost, Business Source 
Complete, and ProQuest yielded fewer than 10 research articles since 2007 that deeply 
explored a specific scandal in one company.  
The problem is that corporate leaders continue to behave unethically, shareholders 
continue to be injured, and there is little understanding on a case-by-case basis of what 
drives leaders to these ethical transgressions. In what sort of organizational environment 
does corporate scandal flourish? We are left to conjecture about cultures of greed, power, 
and personal demons, but never really know what happened to cause management to 
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engage in highly unethical behavior and take the risks executives did with no outward 
signs of guilt or remorse.  
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this study was to explore how and why leadership of this formerly 
prominent and successful company made unethical decisions, created an atmosphere of 
moral disengagement, and destroyed the company. I sought an understanding of the 
ethical environment of the culture and leadership at Adelphia Communications during the 
period between the public offering in 1986, the bankruptcy in 2002, and the dissolution of 
the company in 2006. The following research questions lead to an understanding of the 
influences involved in unethical decision making and corporate corruption. My findings 
may benefit leaders of other publicly traded consumer service organizations as they try to 
understand what triggers unethical decisions. 
Research Questions 
 My research questions were as follows: 
1. Why did the leadership of the highly regarded Adelphia Communications 
make massive unethical financial decisions that led to corporate collapse?  
2. What was the ethical culture and climate at Adelphia, and how did it affect 
unethical behavior and moral disengagement? 
3. How were employees drawn into supporting, ignoring, or initiating unethical 
behavior?  
Conceptual Framework 
Moral development and ethics have roots in psychology, sociology, and 
philosophy, so a broad conceptual framework was necessary (Bandura, 1986; Bishop, 
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2010; J. Cohen et al., 2010; Duska & Whelen, 1975). The framework guiding this study 
was informed by a combination of theories including cognitive moral development 
(CMD) by Kohlberg (1981, 1984), Piaget (1977), and Maslow (1999); the social 
cognitive theory of moral agency (specifically the theory of moral disengagement) by 
Bandura (1986, 1999, 2002); and Victor and Cullen’s (1987) research in ethical 
organizational climate/culture as a foundation for ethical decision making.  
Cognitive Moral Development 
Piaget (1896–1980). Piaget (1977), who is credited with developing the theory of 
cognitive development in the mid-1900s, believed that people, as children, pass through 
four stages of increasing intellectual capacity and capability. Those four stages build on 
each other, making cognitive development and emotional capacity cumulative (Piaget, 
1977). Part of that developmental process includes learning a sense of right and wrong 
(moral development). Piaget (1977) remarked, “All morality consists in a system of rules, 
and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual 
acquires for those rules” (p. 13). Critical to this study is the question that, if respecting 
the rules is the core of morality, how does someone learn to respect the rules? Why does 
respect for the rules often differ so dramatically from the practice of those rules? Children 
who do not grasp the rules see no “fault” in lying (Piaget, 1977). Only later, when 
children are old enough to understand the need for cooperation in society, does guilt or a 
sense of remorse come into play. The theory of cognitive development laid the 
foundation for Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996), who stated that 
moral disengagement allows an individual to feel no remorse for unethical behavior. 
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Moral disengagement is relevant background for the lack of respect for rules and absence 
of remorse for unethical decisions at Adelphia Communications.  
Kohlberg (1927–1987). Kohlberg (1981, 1984) extended Piaget’s (1977) 
theories, exploring the same moral developmental stages beyond childhood. While Piaget 
believed moral development was completed in childhood, Kohlberg (1984) believed it 
evolved throughout one’s lifetime in six stages (Duska & Whelen, 1975). Those six 
stages were split into three levels, two of which Kohlberg (1984) believed were attainable 
during one’s lifetime. The third level was considered extraordinary and probably 
attainable by only highly morally dedicated people, such as Jesus Christ or Mother 
Teresa. Because few lead a totally pure and selfless life, Level 3 was more of an ideal 
than a reality for most human beings (Kohlberg, 1984).  
Kohlberg (1984) believed it was possible to develop physically but to be stunted 
morally, a distinction that offers interesting possibilities for studying unethical leaders. 
Because achieving a higher moral stage requires first passing through the lower stages, 
one’s moral development could be arrested at the lower level. Both Piaget and Kohlberg 
agreed that moral development advances to a higher level through interaction and 
socialization (Bishop, 2010). This universal understanding of moral development 
characteristics, important to the present study, has been defined as: 
The process by which an individual, born with behavior potentialities of an 
enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behavior confined within the 
much narrower range of what is customary and acceptable for him according to 
the standards of his group. (Child, as cited in Kohlberg, 1981, p. 105)  
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Personal moral development, according to Kohlberg (as cited in Bishop, 2010), is 
the outcome of taking our own external cultural influencers and creating internal norms 
for ourselves. One’s moral atmosphere is defined as being a “bridge between judgment 
and action” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. xxxiv). While Kohlberg focused on societal culture 
rather than organizational culture, the environment in which one works becomes a highly 
influential culture (Cullen, Victor, & Stephens, 1989). In this single-case study of 
Adelphia Communications, I explored whether that bridge of moral atmosphere was 
weakened, allowing unethical decisions to be made. Moral action generally conforms to 
the moral stage of the individual (in this case, the leader of the company), and the 
environment in which one lives and grows greatly stimulates that moral development 
(Bishop, 2010). 
Maslow (1908–1970). Maslow’s (1999) beliefs were similar to those of Kohlberg 
(1981, 1984) in that both theorists posited there are stages through which individuals 
must work to attain what Maslow termed “self-actualization” (p. xix). In other words, we 
must come to terms with our basic, innate needs before we can understand how to be true, 
honest, and authentic in any way (Maslow, 1999). According to Maslow (1969), our 
basic needs are physiological/for survival (e.g., food, water, oxygen), safety (basic 
protection and security of a job, family, and a sense of personal well-being), and love and 
belonging or social needs (to feel part of something bigger than oneself). Similar to the 
theories promoted by Piaget (1977) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984), Maslow (1969) believed 
each new level was a stepping stone beyond the previous one, and one could not advance 
out of sequence. All these needs, according to Maslow (1969), are steps on the path to 
self-actualization—the ability to become all one can possibly become (Bishop, 2010).  
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Maslow (1969) believed in a basic human goodness: we individually yearn to be 
everything we can be, and we strive to achieve our best throughout our lives. Self-
actualization, according to Maslow, stresses the importance of moral and ethical behavior 
within a framework of values that will lead an individual naturally to discovering and 
then becoming himself or herself. Whereas Kohlberg (1981, 1984) and Piaget (1977) 
believed that moral awareness is the result of external influences in one’s life, Maslow 
believed the desire to become a morally aware person resides within each of us and needs 
to be nurtured.  
Piaget’s (1977), Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984), and Maslow’s (1969, 1999) theories of 
moral cognitive development suggest possible foundational issues underlying the 
leadership and the corporate structure and decisions at Adelphia Communications. The 
culture of any firm is influenced by the level of personal moral awareness and moral 
development of leadership (Cullen et al., 1989). While an understanding of the moral 
development of the leadership at Adelphia provided foundational insight into the culture 
and unethical decisions that were made, this moral development would be impossible to 
fully assess accurately without a psychological evaluation tool. Cognitive moral 
development (CMD) was not used as an explanation for unethical decisions, but it is 
important to note that CMD is a foundation on which other theories are established. It is 
useful to include this background because we cannot look at moral disengagement or 
ethical climate without some understanding of CMD. 
Ethical Climate Theory 
In the case of Adelphia Communications, it is important to understand the moral 
atmosphere and its influence as the “bridge between judgment and action” that Kohlberg 
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(1984, p. xxxiv) defined. Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds (2006) recommended further 
research be conducted into why people’s moral identity disengages under certain 
circumstances. The theory of ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1987), as embedded in the 
culture of the organization, was used as a theoretical foundation in this study. 
Ethical climate theory is related to Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of CMD in that it is 
considered to involve a series of levels or dimensions of development within the ethical 
climate of an organization (Victor & Cullen, 1987). The determinants of ethics within an 
organization include “the environment in which a firm functions, the form of the 
organization and the company’s history” (Cullen et al., 1989, p. 50). Ethical conflict 
arises when there is differing or diverse commitment to the values of the established 
culture (Arnaud, 2010; Cullen et al., 1989; Duh et al., 2010). 
Most of the body of knowledge on ethical work climate is based on the research 
of Victor and Cullen (1987), who created a framework for much future study. A new and 
broader theory and construct was posed by Arnaud (2010). While Victor and Cullen 
focused on moral judgment and collectively shared moral reasoning as the key 
components to the ethical work climate, Arnaud expanded Victor and Cullen’s premise to 
include other components of ethical decision making. Arnaud’s (2010) four key 
components include “collective moral sensitivity, collective moral judgment, collective 
moral motivation, and collective moral character” (p. 348). As Arnaud (2010) explained, 
“organizational climate emerges from shared perceptions of individual organizational 
members” (p. 348); in other words, the shared norms of an organization create a 
collective climate for the performance of work and a collective moral character of the 
organization. In the case of Adelphia, the theory of ethical climate served as the 
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underpinning to study the collective climate of the organization, along with the individual 
moral disengagement of its leaders. 
Social Cognitive Theory (Moral Disengagement) 
Bandura (1925–). As defined in social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), moral 
reasoning is “translated into actions through self-regulatory mechanisms rooted in moral 
standards and self-sanctions by which moral agency is exercised” (Bandura, 1999, p. 
193). According to social cognitive theory, self-regulation is highly influenced by one’s 
social environment (Bandura, 1986). For example, in an organization, it is possible that 
social isolation could be the result of status differentiation, and social isolation could 
suppress personal moral identity (White et al., 2009). Strong identity with the status 
group to which the individual belongs and the resulting suppression of moral concern 
could cause a leader to engage in practices that outsiders might find unethical. Bandura 
(1999) referred to this suppression of moral identity without any seeming self-regulatory 
mechanism as “moral disengagement” (p. 193). Moral disengagement occurs when an 
individual displaces any feelings of guilt or responsibility for unethical actions (Bandura 
1999). These individuals make a habit of “suspending the self-regulatory processes that 
socio-cognitive theory suggests govern moral behavior” (C. Moore, 2008, p. 129).  
Bandura (1986) suggested that moral disengagement works through mechanisms 
that allow an individual to find ways to compensate and explain questionable actions in a 
positive way, making those actions appear less harmful than they are. Blaming other 
people, reframing and distorting consequences, finding justification, and even blaming 
the victim are all methods of restructuring an action to make it appear less harmful 
(Bandura, 1986). These mechanisms “disengage the self-sanctions that socio-cognitive 
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theory claims drive individual moral behavior” (C. Moore, 2008, p. 131). Moral 
disengagement was a strong possibility in the case of Adelphia Communications, and 
helped to explain the ethical work culture and decision making that occurred at the 
company. 
Bandura (1986, 1999), C. Moore (2008), M. Moore (2008), and White et al. 
(2009) studied morality in terms of behaviors and actions. More recently, an emerging 
field of behavioral ethics describes the field as “the study of individual behavior that is 
subject to or judged according to generally accepted moral norms of behavior” (Treviño 
et al., as cited in De Cremer, Mayer, & Schminke, 2010, p. 2). Inherent in this definition 
is the idea that people must have some level of moral awareness and identity, which is 
often defined as a person’s integrity (De Cremer et al., 2010). It is this moral identity that 
can become deceptively disengaged when one’s urge is to maximize one’s own interest 
(Bandura, 1986, 1999). The field of behavioral ethics often refers to moral 
disengagement as a “reframing” of one’s actions or as “ethical fading” (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004, p. 223). 
There was little discussion found in the literature of the level of morality in 
inaction and silent complicity due to fear for one’s self or pressure to conform. Can one 
be ethical and ignore what is happening around him or her if one’s surroundings are not 
ethical? At Adelphia, I probed any consequences of inaction rather than the consequences 
of having the courage to “blow the whistle.”  
Nature of the Study 
Two qualitative methods of inquiry could have been be used for this type of 
study: phenomenology and case study. Moustakas (1994) said phenomenology should be 
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used “to determine what an experience means for the persons who have had the 
experience and are able to provide a comprehensive description of it” (p. 13). In other 
words, phenomenology is about understanding the essence of the experience of a small 
group of people around a certain phenomenon or event. A case study is the exploration of 
a “bounded system” (Stake, 1995, p. 2) over time, through in-depth data collection and 
analysis, and with multiple sources of information (Yin, 2009). Case study research 
generally answers the questions of how or why a complex situation or specific event 
occurred (Stake, 1995). Creswell (2002) identified case study as “an in-depth exploration 
of a bounded system (e.g., an activity, event, process, or individuals) based on extensive 
data collection” (p. 485) 
Adelphia was a bounded system involving a complex situation, and extensive data 
exist in the public domain (bankruptcy documents, court hearings transcripts, human 
resource documents, financial statements, and SEC filings). The former executives of the 
company were available for personal interviews. A case study of Adelphia seemed to be 
the appropriate method for my study to understand how unethical decisions and an 
immoral atmosphere contributed to the demise of a company. Yin (2009) stated that a 
single-case study can explain a phenomenon through data or can “represent the critical 
test of a significant theory” (p.48). This study used theory as background but did not 
critically test it. Rather, I sought to develop an explanation of the situation through the 
voices of those who were there and through the examination of documents that are in the 
public domain from the bankruptcy of Adelphia. 
While I explored and developed possible explanations, I also considered 
Bandura’s (1986, 1999) theory of moral disengagement and Victor and Cullen’s (1987) 
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ethical climate theory through interview questions on the culture that was created at the 
firm, including how corporate values and morals were implemented (or not implemented) 
throughout the organization. A single-case study provided an opportunity to further the 
understanding of the environment that leads to or promotes corporate corruption on the 
scale demonstrated at Adelphia. 
Many universities and business schools use case study methodology, and 
thousands of ethical case studies exist. For example, a search of Harvard Business 
Review case studies yielded more than 500 case studies on corporate ethics. Several of 
these same institutions maintain case study databases (see Appendix A), and a search of 
these databases indicated most previous studies were based on empirical data such as 
marketing initiatives, sales data, and financial reports (budgets, P&L, balance sheets, 
quarterly results) to identify quantifiable mistakes rather than investigate possible 
qualitative causes of the unethical leadership behind the financial data. I sought and 
reviewed existing research but did not find any qualitative ethical case studies published 
in peer-reviewed journals or the business press (e.g., Fortune, Forbes, Business Week) 
that used open-ended interviews to explore the cause of the moral disconnect underlying 
unethical decisions at one organization.  
Several books have been written about the causes of corporate scandals, leaning 
heavily on blaming the structure of the American corporation as the weak link in 
allowing corruption (Bakan, 2004; Kelly, 2002). The fact that the primary objective of a 
public corporation is to maximize returns to the shareholders can lead to decision making 
that is less than moral and at times unethical (Bakan, 2004).  
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This study was conducted using a purposive sample of 10 executive and midlevel 
managers (vice president level or higher) who were employed by Adelphia 
Communications during the time frame 1996–2006. This purposive sample of 10 
executives was compiled from a published list of more than 100 executives who worked 
at Adelphia, about 50 of whom were contacted after receipt of approval from the Walden 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB). Details on the selection and contact process 
are provided in Chapter 3.  
Operational Definition of Terms 
Following are operational definitions of the terms used in this study.  
Cognitive moral development. A process/evolution of moral growth and maturity 
that occurs in stages paralleling an individual’s mental (cognitive) growth (Kohlberg, 
1981). 
Cultural values. “The embedded moral compass through which a community 
defines good, bad, right, wrong, honorable, and dishonorable” (Thompson, 2010, p. 20). 
Ethical climate. The overall moral atmosphere of an organization, as shown 
through the overall employee perception of the moral environment (Victor & Cullen, as 
cited in D. V. Cohen, 1993). 
Ethical decision. A choice that is both legal and morally acceptable to the general 
population (Jones, as cited in Selart & Johansen, 2010).  
Moral agency. A conceptual framework through which one’s moral conduct is 
“motivated and regulated through the exercise of evaluative self-sanctions” (White et al., 
2009, p. 41). 
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Moral disengagement. “The ability to convince oneself that certain moral 
standards are not applicable to oneself” (Ntayi et al., 2010, p. 96).  
Moral issue. “A moral issue is present where ever individual actions, when freely 
performed, may harm or benefit others”(Jones, as cited in Selart & Johansen, 2010, p. 
129). 
Self-regulation. Controlling one’s own behavior using the three steps of self-
observation, judgment, and self-response (Bandura, 1986). 
 Social cognitive theory. Attributed to Bandura (1986), this behavioral theory is 
based on self-regulation and social modeling.  
 Social modeling. The ability and inclination of people to observe, learn, and copy 
what other people do. 
Unethical decision. A decision that is “either illegal or morally unacceptable to 
the larger community” (Jones, as cited in Selart & Johansen, 2010, p. 129). 
Values. A belief system or set of ideals to which a person or organization of 
people is committed (Ludwick & Silva, 2000). 
Assumptions 
It was assumed that unethical actions occurred at Adelphia Communications 
based on the fact that the company founders and two other senior executives were found 
guilty of fraud and remain incarcerated. Another assumption was that the founders were 
not known as “bad people;” they had no other criminal record and no publicly known 
ethical misconduct in any other part of their lives. Finally, it was assumed that those 
people with whom I spoke did not engage in any illegal actions. Those individuals might 
or might not have been culpable for their actions or inactions. 
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Limitations, Delimitations, and Scope 
Limitations to the study must be acknowledged. One obvious limitation was that 
the two key people involved in the downfall of Adelphia are currently incarcerated and 
one of them is seriously ill. I was not able to interview them. In addition, because several 
years have passed since the dissolution of the company, I was counting on each 
individual’s personal recall of past feelings and cultural issues and had to look for 
possible inconsistencies and ways to resolve them as they occurred. 
Delimitations included the fact that the study involved only Adelphia 
Communications, which was a public company at the time of its demise. Public 
companies must adhere to strict rules of financial management, and it was through 
financial reporting during a particular period of time that the unethical behavior of its 
leadership became apparent. Behavior of leadership during the early days of the 
company, when it was a private enterprise, was not directly investigated. 
At its peak, Adelphia employed more than 4,000 personnel. Of those personnel, 
only a relative few had contact with and influence on the top leaders and their decisions. I 
interviewed 10 top-level executives who worked at Adelphia Communications during the 
time the company went from success to dissolution.  
Significance of the Study and Implications for Social Change 
This study fills a gap in the literature through investigation of a single company 
and its well-publicized demise to understand what happened from an ethical perspective. 
Extensive broad theoretical research was conducted on ethical decision making, ethical 
climate, and moral disengagement, and some of this literature is highlighted in Chapter 2. 
An exhaustive search yielded no in-depth studies of a single company, making this study 
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significant. Also significant is the connection between the conceptual framework 
underlying this study and its application of those theories to practical corporate unethical 
situations that have already occurred and from which we might learn. 
Potential professional application lies in the ability to suggest lessons for other 
corporations to create processes that might encourage ethical behavior and closely follow 
espoused corporate values. These processes might lead to training programs in ethical 
decision making and for more accurate checks and balances during the hiring process. 
Understanding the need for collective norms and corporate value statements that go 
beyond words on paper and are brought to life in everyday decisions and actions should 
be an objective of every organization that seeks to represent itself as a good corporate 
citizen.  
Positive social change might come about through further understanding of 
collective moral disengagement, which can lead to better ethical training and testing 
within work groups and the creation of processes to assist in the early detection of 
collective moral disengagement or unethical behavior. Ethical work climates and 
collective ethical decision making in companies must be topics for open discussions; 
these concepts must be instilled in the company workforce throughout all layers of the 
organization and be consistently demonstrated by its leaders. The more we understand 
how and why the unethical decisions of corporate leaders affect others in and beyond the 
organization, the more chance we have to live in a trustworthy and ethical social 
community. 
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Summary 
This study employed the foundation of cognitive moral development (Piaget, 
1977), and the conceptual frameworks and theories of ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 
1987), and moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986, 1999) to investigate and explain the 
actions of the leaders of Adelphia Communications. Through interviews with 10 senior 
executives of Adelphia Communications, I explored answers to questions of how and 
why the company failed to do the right thing for its owners, its employees, and its 
shareholders. The interviews tell a story that will prove helpful to leaders of other 
organizations in understanding the need to develop, maintain, and promote an 
environment that encourages sound moral and ethical judgment. A review of literature on 
this topic and the conceptual framework underlying this research are offered in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this single-case study was to investigate corporate fraud by 
examining the possible reasons for the unethical decisions that were made by leaders of 
Adelphia Communications. A review of recent literature on the topic of unethical 
decision making and its causes in American corporations is presented in this chapter. 
Particular attention is paid to research on moral cognitive development, moral 
disengagement, and ethical work climate. Unethical corporate behavior is not a new 
problem and researchers have evaluated the phenomenon, resulting in several viable 
theories to explain the problem, as well as leaving gaps that present opportunities for 
additional research. The intent of this review of literature is to support and substantiate 
the conceptual framework, offer details on the problem, and develop connections 
between previous research and the questions used in this study. 
Documentation 
Research for this literature review was conducted by searching multiple scholarly 
and business databases including ProQuest, EBSCOHost, Business Complete, 
LexisNexis, and Hoovers, as well as peer-reviewed journals available in the Sage 
journals, ABI/INFORM, and Emerald management journals databases. Searches were 
also conducted for textbooks, dissertations and abstracts, and electronic materials. 
Internet searches were performed using Google Scholar and Google. Key terms used to 
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retrieve information on ethical decision making and corporate fraud included ethics, 
morality, corporate fraud, corporate scandal, morality in the workplace, fraud in the 
workplace, ethics in the workplace, ethical decision making, business ethics, ethical work 
climate, ethical culture, moral disengagement, moral cognitive development, values, 
ethics training, and moral leadership.  
Searches pertaining to research and case studies on corporations that have 
experienced fraud and unethical decisions were conducted using key words and phrases 
including Adelphia Communications, Enron, Martha Stewart, HealthSouth, John Rigas, 
NewsCorp, WorldCom, Tyco, AIG, Global Crossing, and Qwest. These various searches 
returned peer-reviewed journal articles, newspaper reports, magazine articles, books, and 
websites. Ninety-three articles, 28 books, and 15 websites and case study databases were 
used for this review.  
Case study research in this context needs to be distinguished from educational 
case study, which is used to teach business in many universities. Practical exploration of 
theoretical studies creates a great learning opportunity, and case study used in the 
classroom may promote skilled decision making and engaged discussion around a real-
life situation. However, the criteria for producing classroom case study materials do not 
include the same rigor as case study research used either to test theory or to explore areas 
of current limited knowledge (Darke et al., 1998; Yin, 2009).  
Corporate Ethical Dilemma 
In 2002, President George W. Bush created the President’s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force to restore confidence in American business. Since that time, there have been more 
than 1,300 corporate fraud convictions of 200 chief executive officers, more than 120 
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vice presidents, and more than 50 chief financial officers from companies across America 
(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 2012). President Obama, 
building on Bush’s Fraud Task Force, created a Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 
in 2009 to hold accountable those who had caused past financial crises and to prevent 
them in the future (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 2009). By 
the end of 2011, there were 242 indictments and 241 convictions of corporate criminals 
in the United States, along with more than 1,800 securities and commodities fraud 
pending cases (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). There 
have been fewer convictions under Obama’s administration overall, although the Obama 
administration came down hard on SAC, a major hedge fund firm, for illegal activity, 
which made major headlines (Lattman & Protess, 2013). And data available from the 
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.) show monthly 
indictments and convictions averaging 15 or more per month. 
Despite the crackdown on corporate fraud and legislation put in place to require 
executives to be aware of fraudulent financial activities in their organizations (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, n.d.), the unethical behavior continues. Companies like Enron, 
Adelphia, Tyco, and Lehman Brothers collapsed under mismanagement, and unethical 
decision making is at the core of the mismanagement (Copeland, 2005; Duska, 2005). 
Many companies have standard legal principles on which they base decisions (Bowen & 
Heath, 2005), so perhaps more attention should be paid to ethical principles.  
The concept of ethics has been applied to the study of business since the 1950s, 
with the topic of corruption headlining much of the research (Rabl, 2011). Through the 
evolution of ethics and morality theory, the early discussion and application was 
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primarily from a societal perspective rather than a business perspective (Ciulla, 2004). 
Moral cognitive development theories offered by Piaget (1977), Maslow (1969, 1999), 
and Kohlberg (1981, 1984) proposed stages of moral development in human beings, but 
did not apply the characteristics of those stages to the business community or to 
leadership capabilities. Ethics as a critical part of business leadership was barely a topic 
of research as late as 1974, when the third edition of Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of 
Leadership (Bass, 1974/1990), a top leadership “bible,” was published. Of the 1,150 
pages in that work, fewer than four were devoted to ethics (Bass, 1974/1990). 
As the 20th century wound to a close, theorists started to link ethical leadership to 
the styles of servant leadership and transformational leadership. However, the broader 
public acceptance of a connection between ethics and leadership was not achieved until 
the collapse of Enron in 2001, when fraud by corporate leadership made front-page news 
around the world. Enron quickly became notorious for unethical leadership, and its 
collapse brought to light the excess privilege and deceit of its leaders, none of whom 
stepped forward to accept responsibility (C. E. Johnson, 2005). 
In 1985, a survey conducted jointly by The New York Times and CBS indicated 
58% of Americans believed corporate executives were dishonest. While there was 
certainly corporate fraud prior to Enron, there was none as large and as publicly covered 
as Enron was at the time. In the 10 years since passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002-- the  post-Enron reform that was supposed to end questionable financial accounting 
practices-- stories of fraudulent behavior make it unclear whether anything has changed: 
• 2002: “Prosecutors indicted ex-Tyco International CEO Dennis Kozlowski, 
former CFO Mark Swartz and ex-general counsel Mark Belnick Thursday on 
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charges of orchestrating a web of deals that looted the company of at least 
$600 million” (“Three Tyco execs indicted for fraud,” 2002).  
• 2003: “SEC charges HealthSouth Corp. CEO Richard Scrushy with $1.4 
billion accounting fraud” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003) 
• 2004: “A federal jury found Adelphia Communications Corp. founder John J. 
Rigas and his son Timothy, the former chief financial officer, guilty of 
conspiring to loot the cable television company of millions of dollars” 
(Masters & White, 2004).  
• 2005: “New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued American International 
Group Thursday, alleging the firm manipulated its books to deceive regulators 
and the investing public” (“Spitzer sues AIG,” 2005).  
• 2008: “Bernard Madoff, a prominent money manager and former chairman of 
the Nasdaq Stock Market, has confessed to losing $50 billion of his investors' 
funds in a Ponzi scheme” (“Madoff fraud hits investors worldwide,” 2009) 
• 2011: “Britain’s biggest selling Sunday newspaper will close after failing to 
hold itself to account in the phone hacking scandal, it was announced last 
night” (Wells & Willetts, 2011)  
• 2012: “JPMorgan’s black eye nears $6B as bank says traders may have tried 
to conceal losses” (Wagner & Gogoi, 2012).  
 One website, WanttoKnow.info (“For Those Who Want to Know,” n.d.), lists 50 
pages of corporate corruption news stories for 2012 alone. Public outcry has been strong. 
Results of a 2009 poll indicated the vast majority of Americans gave corporate America a 
grade of either D or F for honesty and ethical conduct, with 58% of respondents saying 
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that leadership in corporate America was “poor”(Knights of Columbus & Marist College 
Institute for Public Opinion, 2009). 
Frameworks for Ethical Leadership and Decision Making 
With unethical corporate leadership a topic of increasing interest, research and 
analysis on ethical leadership and decision making has increased since 2000 (Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, Treviño, & Klebe, 2010; M. Moore, 2008; Rabl, 2011; Selart & 
Johansen, 2010). Searches of major business databases using the general terms of ethical 
decision making and ethical leadership yielded more than 3,000 peer-reviewed articles, 
an indication of the interest in understanding more about this topic.  
Researchers in the past have attempted to understand a variety of aspects of 
ethical conduct in the workplace and approached the issue from multiple perspectives or 
frameworks including sociology, psychology, philosophy, and organizational science 
(Rabl, 2011; Treviño, Brown, & Hartman, 2003; Treviño et al., 2006). However the 
framework for this study was informed by a combination of early cognitive moral 
development theory (Piaget, 1977), ethical climate theory (Victor & Cullen, 1988), and 
moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 1986, 1999). 
Ethical Decisions and Cognitive Moral Development 
Researchers from the perspective of organizational science have generally 
considered ethical decision making to be “a conscious, intentional, and deliberative 
process” (Zhong, 2011, p. 2). This analytic and cognitive point of view was influenced by 
Kolhberg’s (1981, 1984) cognitive moral development theory, which describes moral 
reasoning as something that is developed in multiple stages as an individual matures. 
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Some people are able to attain higher levels of cognitive morality than are others, 
according to Kohlberg (1984). 
Kohlberg’s (1981) three stages of development (preconventional, conventional, 
and postconventional) all focus on a rational decision being based on conscious reasoning 
and analysis of a moral situation, as if one were a judge weighing its fairness. The 
preconventional stage is seen mostly in children. This stage is self-serving and decisions 
are based on consequences (possible punishment). Conventional thinking comes later, 
when the individual is able to consider the impact on people around him or her. The 
individual who is capable of postconventional thinking adheres to rules, laws, or 
standards; employing postconventional thinking becomes a way of “promoting general 
social welfare” (Zhong, 2011, p. 2) in which a decision is based on more complex 
reasoning. 
Critical to cognitive theory is the ability of the individual to recognize a moral 
dilemma so that he or she may make a rational decision. Rest (1986) proposed that one 
must first recognize a moral dilemma, judge it, establish moral intent, and then make a 
decision regarding it. Basic moral awareness is fundamental to moral behavior and thus 
to the ability to recognize a moral dilemma (Blum, 1991; VanSandt, Shepard, & Zappe, 
2006). An exploration of more than 90 research articles on ethical decision making leads 
one to the realization that moral awareness is not enough to make an ethical decision. The 
environment in which one makes the decision has much to do with how the decision is 
made. 
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Ethical Climate Theory as a Predictor of Moral Awareness 
Most early research on ethical climate is attributed to Victor and Cullen (1987, 
1988), who proposed a framework for ethical culture by building on Kohlberg’s (1984) 
three stages of cognitive moral development. While Kohlberg referred to the 
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional stages of moral development, Victor 
and Cullen (1988) stated that ethical climates might be formed in three similar levels of 
ethical theory: egoism, benevolence, and principle. An egotistic climate is self-serving, 
and employees in this climate will form decisions in their own self-interest. In a 
benevolent climate, employees will tend to take others into consideration when they 
make decisions. If the culture is principled, decisions will be based on codes and rules 
(Victor & Cullen, 1988). These three classifications, described in terms of an 
organizational environment, exhibit the same sequencing of personal moral reasoning as 
Kohlberg applied on an individual level (Ambrose, Arnaud, & Schminke, 2007; 
VanSandt et al., 2006). 
An ethical culture reflects “the collective ethical values and behaviors of all 
employees, managers, and leaders” (Gebler, 2006, p. 337). Such a culture involves shared 
moral reasoning and will influence employees to be loyal and to make the best possible 
ethical decisions when challenges arise (Ambrose et al., 2007; Duh et al., 2010; Van 
Aswegen & Engelbrecht, 2009; Victor & Cullen, 1987). Research indicates that an 
ethical work climate is a “primary predictor of individual moral awareness” (VanSandt et 
al., 2006, p. 409). 
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Companies and their leaders do not set out to be unethical; most companies have 
established elements in place to protect against unethical behavior. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (n.d.) was passed to respond to the growing number of instances of corporate 
fraud and the resulting decline in investor confidence. The legislation requires every 
public company to adopt a code of ethics, a mandate that was intended to help deter 
unethical behavior (Schminke, Arnaud, & Kuenzi, 2007). In general, companies that have 
a code of ethics and a set of corporate values show an intent to practice high integrity 
(Mayer et al., 2010; Parboteeah et al., 2010), but unless codes of ethics and sets of 
corporate values are enforced through specific and targeted management practices, they 
will not create an ethical culture (Schminke et al., 2007; Stevens, 2008). Leaders must 
exhibit the characteristics of the code and be accountable for enforcing it. They must 
“walk the talk” with actions that support ethical decisions and behaviors, even if the 
company might suffer financially. For example, if research in a pharmaceutical company 
shows a product to be harmful, the leader in an ethical culture must make the decision to 
pull the drug from the market and to alert customers who have bought it. As Van 
Aswegen and Engelbrecht (2009) remarked, “An organization’s ethical climate should be 
a natural overflow of leaders’ commitment to ethical principles and values expressed in 
their daily struggle to live by them” (p. 176). 
Because organizational climate is, by definition, the way the employees and 
management of a company perceive the company, there is a need to look at the factors 
affecting that perception. Those factors could relate to individual characteristics such as 
age, gender, and job satisfaction, or to situational variables within the company such as 
one’s department or position in the hierarchy (D. V. Cohen, 1993; Gebler, 2006). It is 
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also possible to have different climates in different divisions of the company, especially 
within groups whose members work together for a long period of time and develop a 
level of trust and understanding (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Vardi, 2001). The form of the 
company may play a role in determining the perception of ethical climate. Whether the 
organization is a corporation, a not-for-profit entity, or a family-owned business, that 
structure may predict different perceptions of ethical climate (Martin & Cullen, 2006; 
Schminke et al., 2007). The orientation of the firm (entrepreneurial versus bureaucratic, 
for example) and its leadership and management style will also affect ethical climate 
perception (Ambrose et al., 2007; Cullen et al., 1989). 
For the purpose of this study, it was critical to explore the role of corporate 
leaders in creating, promoting, and maintaining ethical climate. Work climate can affect 
behavior, attitude, and overall corporate success or failure (Schminke, Ambrose, & 
Neubaum, 2005). Leaders need to model correct behavior, which in turn will help enforce 
the employee behaviors that are acceptable in the workplace (Clement, 2006). Stringer 
(2002) stated, “the single most important determinant of an organization’s climate is the 
day-to-day behavior of the leaders of the organization” (p. 12). This correlation was 
reinforced in a recent study by Mayer et al. (2010), empirically confirming a link between 
ethical leadership and employee misconduct.  
Rest (1986) proposed individual ethical decision making could only come about 
through the psychological processes of moral judgment, moral sensitivity, moral 
motivation, and moral character. More recently, others have suggested that individual 
morality also applies to the moral climate of the workplace, and that shared moral norms 
are essential for an ethical organizational climate (Arnaud, 2010; Mayer et al., 2010; 
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Victor & Cullen, 1988). Tension may arise in organizations in which there is a disconnect 
between the leaders’ values and those of the employees, influencing the employees’ 
attitudes toward loyalty, job satisfaction, and the desire to leave (Schminke et al., 2005). 
Schminke et al. (2005) empirically proved a relationship between the extent to which a 
leader uses his or her moral reasoning and the ethical climate of the organization. What 
might we find in the levels of moral awareness if research were conducted using a group 
of corporate leaders who have all been found guilty of corporate corruption? An 
extensive search of literature yielded no such study and such an investigation exceeded 
the scope of the current study. 
As part of a leader’s moral responsibility, Parboteeah et al. (2010) suggested lack 
of communication and poor empowerment of employees are two major threads in 
corporate climates in which ethical scandals have been experienced. Managers and 
leaders can promote adherence to ethical standards through strong written and verbal 
communication, frequent group meetings, and constant application of corporate standards 
to employee actions and decisions (Parboteeah et al., 2010). Lack of consistent 
reinforcement by management may make it difficult for employees to make their own 
moral decisions, while empowered employees generally make decisions that benefit the 
workplace (Elçi & Alpkan, 2008).  
Leaders’ values generally help shape the climate of an organization (Brown & 
Mitchell, 2010), and an ethical leader can be a strong role model in a company (Treviño 
et al., 2006). When leaders exhibit unethical behavior, few employees will remain 
untouched. The overall climate will be one of poor communication, low morale, and a 
lack of personal empowerment (Parboteeah et al., 2010; Stevens, 2008; Uhl-Bien & 
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Carsten, 2007). Some executives are aware of the connection between their behavior and 
those of their employees. In a speech in 2006, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney (as cited in 
Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007) said, “If an organization’s leaders don’t model, encourage, 
expect and reward the right behaviors, why should anyone in that organization exhibit 
those behaviors?” (p. 187). 
A premise of hierarchical organizations is that those individuals at the higher level 
make the rules and those individuals at the lower level follow them. Often, employees 
believe or are told it is not their job to question, creating a climate of blind obedience, 
rather than one in which employees are empowered to openly communicate with and 
challenge their leaders. These sentiments can encourage an unethical climate in which 
silence and fear are the norms and dialogue is forbidden (Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007). 
Environments in which dialogue is discouraged may lead employees to fear retaliation for 
exposing unethical behavior (such as was the case at Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom). 
The worst consequences of silence and following a leader unwaveringly were 
exemplified in the horrors of the Jonestown Massacre (“Inside the Jonestown massacre,” 
2008), in which most of the followers of a charismatic cult leader drank poison and died. 
In studying ethical climate and its predictors, little research appears to have been 
conducted on empowerment of lower level managers to provide ethical leadership 
upward when it is seemingly lacking at the top. Remaining silent out of fear of retaliation 
should not be the standard in any environment.  
Can individuals with varying degrees of moral development coexist successfully? 
Kohlberg(1984) believed they could, while Victor and Cullen (1988) pointed out that 
“behavior compliance with a group or organizational climate incongruent with an 
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individual’s level of moral development may lead to adaptive reactions such as stress or 
whistle blowing” (p. 105). People may behave unethically when they do not feel attached 
to the organization. In other words, when there is a disconnect between personal values 
and needs and those exhibited by the management of the corporation, the employee may 
no longer feel a commitment to the organization (Kapstein, 2011). Corporations seem to 
have their own sets of ethics that define them, just as individuals do, but in a corporate 
situation, individuals are more prone to follow the guidelines and pressures of the 
corporation than their own personal values (Cullen et al., 1989; Kapstein, 2011; 
Thompson, 2010), possibly opening a door to fraud. 
Moral Disengagement as an Enabler to Unethical Behavior 
According to Bandura’s (1986, 1999) theory of moral disengagement, some 
people, through their own cognitive process, are able to ignore or override their personal 
ethical codes of behavior without any feelings of guilt. This suspension of personal ethics 
allows individuals to make decisions that would be considered unethical by the 
population in general (Bandura, 1999). Carrying this logic into the workplace, if there is 
any apparent moral disengagement on the part of the leader, moral disengagement will 
reflect into the ranks of the organization, making it possible for moral disengagement to 
play a role in the creation of corporate corruption (M. Moore, 2008). 
Theoretical research exists on moral disengagement in areas such as predicting 
behavior in adolescents, as a possible explanation for aggression in the military, and in 
exploring political violence (Bandura et al., 1996). Prior to 2000, little research existed in 
the use of moral disengagement to explain corporate corruption. Since 2000, the world 
has witnessed corporate scandals of epic proportion (e.g., Enron, Tyco) and more 
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attention is being paid to the moral conduct of the leaders of those companies (White et 
al., 2009).  
White et al. (2009) studied how the removal of self-censuring from harmful 
practices can affect the world of corporate research (in this case, the study involved 
research in the tobacco, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicon industries). The researchers 
found that moral disengagement is not always practiced by just one individual in an 
organization, but it can become part of the collective force, or “members acting together 
on shared beliefs” (White et al., 2009, p. 42). If members can act badly together, then 
collective moral disengagement can result from the group interaction and the cultural 
dynamics (Zimbardo, 2008). White et al.’s study shows a clear collective force of 
negative influence in a group, and it seems likely (although more research is necessary) 
that this same collective force could be the case in a family-managed business such as 
Adelphia. If at least one member (in this case, the head) of that family was morally 
disengaged, other family members could easily follow.  
Moral disengagement appears to be a common tool for activating the on-off 
switch of ethical behavior (Bandura, 1986). This deactivation of moral behavior is done 
through eight mechanisms: (a) moral justification, (b) advantageous comparison, (c) 
euphemistic labeling, (d) displacement of responsibility, (e) diffusion of responsibility, 
(f) disregarding or distorting the consequences, (g) dehumanization, and (h) attribution of 
blame (Bandura et al., 1996). Each of these mechanisms allows an individual with high 
self-concept to eliminate personal blame for his or her actions. In other words, the 
individual uses these various mechanisms to allow for dishonesty without guilt. It is 
important to the individual to maintain his or her self-regard, and employing the 
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disengagement mechanism allows the individual to act within the scope of what is 
considered “acceptable dishonesty” (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008, p. 642).  
From a psychological point of view, moral disengagement could be considered a 
form of self-deception. It is possible to act in one’s personal interest while falsely 
believing the intent is moral/ethical (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). The psychological 
factors that are at work to allow ethical behavior to fall aside as part of self-deception are 
very similar to the “excuses” that are formed during moral disengagement. Tenbrunsel 
and Messick (2004) referred to this thought process as “ethical fading”: the ability to 
excuse actions in self-interest as moral and ethical. Both Bandura (1999) and Tenbrusel 
& Messick (2004) agreed that we create language to displace unethical behavior with 
something more neutral. For example, the term right-sizing instead of lay-offs helps to 
put a positive spin on the situation (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
Although ethics is a communal endeavor, the leaders of some organizations seem 
to believe they need not be part of that collective (Ciulla, 2004). The idea that individuals 
rationalize their unethical behavior is not new, but it is only in the last few years that 
moral disengagement has been studied to any extent in the workplace. Now there are 
studies to justify the hypothesis that the mechanisms used for moral disengagement are 
solid predictors of unethical behavior in the workplace (Barsky, 2011; Detert et al., 2008; 
M. Moore, 2008; Naso, 2006). By quashing the feelings of psychological discomfort, 
moral disengagement may actually lay a fertile foundation for corporate corruption (M. 
Moore, 2008). 
It is up to the leader to set the tone for the company. If employees perceive they 
will advance more quickly through unethical practices, and if leaders do not punish those 
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measures, but instead seem to reward them, those employees will further embed 
potentially corrupt practices into the organization (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; M. Moore, 
2008). It makes sense that there would be little reason to feel badly for behavior that is 
acceptable to the leader and for which an individual does not have to take personal 
responsibility. 
Summary 
Ethical climate and moral disengagement have been found to be underlying 
reasons for unethical decisions in the workplace (Ambrose et al., 2007; Gebler, 2006; 
VanSandt et al., 2006). Little exploratory qualitative case study research exists on the 
subject of corporate climate and the possible moral disengagement of the leadership from 
the perspective of the employees. Databases filled with business ethics case studies are 
maintained by many organizations and universities (see Appendix A), but case study 
research on moral behavior of corporate leaders, and more specifically immoral behavior 
of leaders of defunct corporations and what causes it, is lacking. I sought to begin to fill 
this gap in the case study literature with a specific exploratory case study of Adelphia 
Communications. 
Moral awareness, ethical climate, and moral disengagement are clearly all related 
to ethical behavior in a corporation (Bandura, 2002; Mayer et al., 2010; Stevens, 2008). 
Just how each of these factors tie together and produce unethical behavior needs to be 
explored in a real-life situation. An exploratory case study of Adelphia Communications 
provided a window to what went wrong in one company, which may help future leaders 
of corporate America to understand the ethical responsibility before them. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore and analyze the culture, leadership, and 
breakdown in ethical and moral decision making that occurred at Adelphia 
Communications. This chapter presents the details of the research design and its 
rationale, my role as the researcher, the specific methodology including the instruments 
and procedures I used, and the treatment and analysis of data. Dependability and 
reliability of the study, and any ethical concerns, are also addressed. 
Research Design, Methodology, and Rationale 
The research questions explored in this study are as follows: 
1. Why did the leadership of the highly regarded Adelphia Communications 
make massive unethical financial decisions that led to corporate collapse?  
2. What was the ethical culture and climate at Adelphia, and how did it affect 
unethical behavior and moral disengagement? 
3. How were employees drawn into supporting, ignoring, or initiating unethical 
behavior?  
Through interviews, I explored the experiences of a group of former senior 
employees of Adelphia Communications, and related and analyzed their interpretations of 
the ethical environment and the actions of the leadership to answer the research 
questions.  
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Qualitative research is descriptive and usually employs a purposeful sample, 
while quantitative research uses more numbers than words to describe an issue, and 
generally uses a random selection for sampling (Creswell, 2007). Obtaining answers to 
the research questions required me to obtain rich descriptions of events from a purposive 
sampling of past executives, underscoring the need for qualitative rather than quantitative 
research. Finally, I, as researcher, was the primary instrument through which the data 
were collected, rather than a scale, survey, or other inanimate instrument, another 
distinction of qualitative research (Merriam, 2009).  
Case study was the appropriate form of research design for my research. Because 
the unit of analysis was one company and one group of executives within that company, 
it could be described as a bounded system, and study of a bounded system calls for case 
study as the research design (Yin, 2009; Zivkovic, 2012). Yin (2009) described the case 
study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context” (p. 18).  
While case study can be used to achieve a variety of end results, it can provide 
description and exploration where knowledge may be lacking (Darke et al., 1998). In this 
case, we know that Adelphia went bankrupt, that the founder and his son are in prison, 
and that the company was dissolved. The opportunity to hear firsthand from past 
employees about the corporate climate and the level of moral awareness and engagement 
of the leadership was an opportunity to explore and learn about the culture of Adelphia 
and personalities of its leaders that led to its collapse. Interviews are best used to find out 
things we cannot observe directly. In a catastrophic situation that happened in the past, 
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such as that experienced by Adelphia, the best way to learn about it and from it is by 
talking with those who were there and experienced it firsthand. 
Role of the Researcher 
I contacted 71 former executives of Adelphia Communications from a list I 
compiled using the online database LinkedIn (n.d.). I sent them each a consent form via 
e-mail explaining the nature of my dissertation study and asking for their participation. I 
expected at least a 20% acceptance rate from this letter, but actually got over 40%. I then 
narrowed the field of willing participants to 10 who had direct contact with the senior 
management team and who were at Adelphia just before and after the bankruptcy. To 
collect data, I conducted interviews using the specific prepared interview questionnaire. 
All questions were open-ended, so I participated in drawing out and listening to each 
person.  
Some of the possible 71 participants I contacted were casual business 
acquaintances. I did have Adelphia as a business client before the scandals took place, 
and many of the former executives of Adelphia are now working elsewhere in the cable 
industry. Because of my activities in executive recruitment in that industry, several of the 
names of the executives I interviewed were familiar to me, and three were people I had 
met casually at some point over the previous 10 years. My previous experience with these 
individuals or my activities in executive recruitment did not influence or control the 
answers I received. My identity in the industry is one of high integrity and confidential 
work, so it may have been positive for me to be known, if only by reputation, by some of 
the people I contacted.  
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My current role in my company demands the utmost confidentiality and often 
anonymity as well, and I am able to convey that protection to others, a characteristic I 
called upon in my role as researcher. I did not use names or identifying factors in the 
study. In addition, my ability to interview, listen, assemble contextual information, make 
assessments, and maintain confidentiality, were important in my role as researcher. I did 
not anticipate any ethical issues or issues of bias to surface. 
Methodology  
Participant Selection  
As Cullen et al. (1989) remarked, “The best way to find out about an 
organization’s ethical climate is to ask the people who work there about it” (p. 53). I 
interviewed 10 former executives of Adelphia Communications for this study. These 
former executives were men and women who worked at the level of vice president or 
above, and who worked at the company during the years 2000–2006, right before the 
scandal erupted and during the bankruptcy. I identified more than 1,300 former Adelphia 
employees, and I initiated contact with 71 of them after I received approval to proceed 
from the Walden IRB. I received a positive response and narrowed the field by seniority, 
diversity of role within the company, and reporting relationship. I wanted executives with 
direct reporting contact to the Rigas family.  
The population I targeted was directly involved in strategy, human resources, 
procedure, and decision making at Adelphia during the time that fraud was discovered 
and the company collapsed.  Of this population, four people were indicted, and two of 
them were convicted and are in prison. I worked on obtaining permission to meet with the 
two incarcerated individuals; they are held in a low-security federal prison. However, I 
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was unable to secure timely permission to meet with them and I was confident I could 
complete a thorough study without them. The remainder of the sample population 
reported directly or indirectly to the people indicted and had interesting and sometimes 
differing points of view about what occurred. The sample of 10 previous employees was 
ideal because the size allowed me to speak with enough people to get varying points of 
view and to hear about the company from different functional perspectives. Viewing the 
company through the lens of different executives in different departments added to the 
context needed for validity. 
Instrumentation 
After receiving a signed consent form from each participant, I scheduled phone 
interviews at mutually convenient times. I had planned to travel to meet with each person, 
but the distance and timing proved impossible to manage. I decided to allow the 
executives to choose their own location for a call, a process intended to put them at ease 
and make the interview as convenient as possible. 
The questions posed in the interviews were formulated to allow for personal 
interpretation by the interviewee, allowing him or her to describe the culture, leadership 
characteristics, and personal point of view of the company during his or her years at the 
firm (see Appendix B). Each interview was recorded (with the interviewee’s permission) 
and later transcribed for further analysis. I anticipated each interview would require 60–
90 minutes, which was accurate. No phone follow-ups were required. I prepared for my 
interviews by accessing legal and Securities and Exchange Commission documents, all in 
the public domain, and reviewing the business press on the collapse of Adelphia to 
reinforce my understanding of the timeline and facts leading up to the actual bankruptcy 
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and collapse of the company. Several books written on the issue of corporate corruption 
lent additional context to the business climate at the time. Human resource documents 
such as a mission statement or code of ethics were not found. 
I debriefed each participant at the conclusion of our interview by confirming the 
confidentiality of their name and specific comments, and offering to share the findings of 
the study with them. I thanked them for their participation, emphasizing the need for 
studies such as this one to help to better understand how a corporate collapse such as 
Adelphia occurred. Data from the interviews and the materials collected were analyzed 
and coded by connection to each research question.  
Trustworthiness 
The primary ethical issue in this study pertained to the treatment of human 
participants. I did not need institutional permission from Adelphia because the company 
no longer exists. I did need an individual consent from each former executive, and I 
either received that on the consent form or recorded a verbal consent at the outset of our 
telephonic interview. The individuals did not have any ethical concerns about 
participating in this study because the company has dissolved and the indictment of the 
chief executive officer and chief financial officer are facts of public record. 
All data collected for this study have been and will be kept confidential. None of 
the comments have been attributable to any individual by name. The study has strong 
credibility and dependability, given the level of the participants’ positions in the company 
and proximity to the key leadership. Any specific facts pertaining to the bankruptcy were 
triangulated with materials from the Securities and Exchange Commission and national 
news reports, as well as the court records. 
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Tape recordings of the participants were transcribed, and the transcripts and the 
tapes were kept in a locked safe in my office. After analysis, the tapes and written data 
were moved to a secure lock box, and all data will be destroyed after five years. Only the 
researcher had access to identifiable data because they were de-identified before 
transcription. 
Summary 
This qualitative single case study investigated the culture, unethical decisions, and 
moral disintegration of Adelphia Communications, as told by the executives who 
witnessed it. Care was taken to choose the appropriate method and research design for 
this study, select a sample population of senior-level executives who were there at the 
appropriate time, and to provide an ethical study with total trustworthiness. As the 
researcher, I am comfortable that I maintained an objective point of view, that I had no 
conflicts, and that I have met the purpose of the study. Answers to the research questions 
may provide information that could lead to positive social change in the area of business 
ethics in corporate America. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Findings 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore how and why leadership of this formerly 
prominent and successful company made unethical decisions, created an atmosphere of 
moral disengagement, and destroyed the company. The research questions were the 
following: 
1. Why did the leadership of the highly regarded Adelphia Communications 
make massive unethical financial decisions that led to corporate collapse? 
2. What was the ethical culture and climate at Adelphia, and how did it affect 
unethical behavior and moral disengagement?  
3. How were employees drawn into supporting, ignoring, or initiating unethical 
behavior?  
The purpose of this chapter is to document and present the findings from the data 
collected. The selection of participants and method of collecting data are described in this 
chapter, as are any patterns and themes arising in the process. An introductory setting and 
background of the case are presented to help contextualize the findings. The results are 
analyzed in Chapter 5. 
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Setting and Background  
It is important to recognize the facts of the Adelphia story to fully understand and 
contextualize the results of this study. A full timeline of Adelphia’s history is provided in 
Appendix C. 
Adelphia Communications was founded in 1952 and incorporated in 1972 by 
John Rigas and his brother, Gus, who had acquired several small cable television 
franchises in New York and Pennsylvania (Mahar & Fischer, n.d.). In the early 1980s, 
John’s three sons joined the firm: Michael was vice president of operations, Tim was 
chief financial officer, and James was head of strategic planning and also chief executive 
officer of a small business subsidiary (Gilson & Villalonga, 2010). The family decided to 
take the company public in 1986, creating two levels of stock (one of which assured 
voting control), and kept several cable properties private (Mahar & Fischer, n.d.).  
The Rigas family continued to acquire cable properties, both for the private entity 
and for the public one. Lowenstein (2004) reported in The New York Times that John felt  
if something ever went wrong with Adelphia, he would always be able to count on the 
private business—as if going public had been some newfangled experiment he hadn’t 
quite bought into. Psychologically he didn’t make the transition to being public (p. 3). 
In the early days of cable television, cable systems were often family-owned and family-
operated businesses. Comcast Cable, Century Communications, and Cablevision Systems 
were a few of the companies started by a father and son team (Gilson & Villanova, 2010).  
As late as 2005, the eight largest cable operators had strong family control, with over 
50% of the U.S. cable population being controlled by those eight companies (Gilson & 
Villalonga, 2010). 
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Since its inception in 1952, Adelphia was headquartered in Coudersport, 
Pennsylvania, a small farm community that experienced tremendous growth with the rise 
of Adelphia. The Rigas family hired many of the townspeople and improved the area 
greatly for those who lived there (Mahar & Fischer, n.d.). However, besides community 
expansion, the Rigas family began to finance family expenses and investments through 
Adelphia once it went public in 1986, and borrowed Adelphia money without revealing 
the debt on the company balance sheet (Gilson & Villalonga, 2010).  
In the late 1990s, the cable industry was struggling with a slowing economy and 
increased competition. Adelphia, then the sixth largest cable operator in the country, was 
highly leveraged, having acquired multiple cable systems and other businesses over the 
previous decade (Gilson & Villalonga, 2010; Lowenstein, 2004; Mathisen & Foley, 
2006). By 2002, primarily through these acquisitions, Adelphia grew to over $3 billion in 
sales, serving nearly 5 million subscribers, and having over 15,000 employees nationwide 
(“Adelphia Communications corp,“ n.d.). 
The Rigases had also begun to purchase large amounts of Adelphia stock, and 
some analysts began to wonder where the cash for these acquisitions was coming from 
(Gilliland, 2012). The stock price, once listed at $87 a share, was falling, and it seemed 
that Adelphia would not have funds to pay back debt that was owed for the Rigases’ 
repurchase of stock (Healy,1997). 
On March 27, 2002, on an analyst phone call, a Merrill Lynch employee asked 
about a footnote in the financial report regarding more than $1 billion of stock the 
Rigases had purchased (Gilliland, 2012). When asked how the Rigases could afford the 
47 
 
purchase, Tim Rigas, chief financial officer, had no answer, and a downward spiral was 
set in motion. Within days, it was announced that the Rigas family owed more than $3 
billion to the company, and not just for stock repurchasing (Cauley, 2007). By May 2002, 
the family was gone from the company and the board, and by June 2002, the stock was 
delisted from the NASDAQ (Lowenstein, 2004).  Adelphia filed for bankruptcy on June 
25, 2002, and arrests and indictments of family members and some senior employees 
occurred in July 2002 (see Table 1). Ultimately, the family fortune was lost, creating a 
$715 million fund to partially repay investors (Fabrikant, 2005).  
Table 1 
 
Adelphia Convictions 
Name/age/position Charge Counts Verdict 
John Rigas, 79, 
father and former chief 
executive officer  
Conspiracy, bank and securities fraud 
Wire fraud  
18 
5  
Guilty 
Not guilty  
Timothy Rigas, 48, 
son and former chief 
financial officer  
Conspiracy, bank and securities fraud 
Wire fraud  
18 
5  
Guilty 
Not guilty  
Michael Rigas, 50, 
son and former executive 
vice president of operations  
Conspiracy and wire fraud 
Securities and bank fraud  
6 
17  
Not guilty 
Undecided  
Michael Mulcahey, 46, 
former assistant treasurer  
Conspiracy, securities, wire and bank 
fraud  
23  Not guilty  
 
 
Note. Adapted from “Adelphia Founder and One Son Are Found Guilty,” by P. Grant & 
C. Nuzum (Eds.), 2004, The Wall Street Journal, p. A1. Copyright 2004 by Dow Jones & 
Company. Used with permission. 
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Sample Demographics 
To explore why and how such serious ethical lapses occurred, I planned to 
interview executives who were employed by the organization in the period that Adelphia 
existed before, during, and just after the founder and his son were imprisoned for fraud 
(2002) and who had a direct working relationship with at least one member of the Rigas 
family (John, Michael, Timothy, or James). The executives who participated in this case 
study presented stories from an insider’s perspective unavailable in the press and the 
court transcripts, which did not often include any analysis of why the fraud happened, 
only of the fraud itself. 
A search of the online site, LinkedIn.com (n.d.) returned the names of more than 
1,380 former Adelphia employees. I narrowed that list to 71 people with the title of VP 
and above and who I thought might have had direct contact with the Rigas family during 
their tenure at Adelphia. Of the 71 possible executives, I found 10 executives (seven men 
and three women) willing to participate who fit the specific demographic of being 
employed by Adelphia during the years the fraud occurred and who also had a close 
working relationship with a family member. I believed these employees would have the 
most relevant stories and experiences and would be able to comment precisely on the 
actions of the family. Therefore, I narrowed my initial plans to conduct the study from an 
indeterminate number to 10 executives. These 10 executives are coded in the results as 
Exec A–Exec J, and their interviews were held between June 3, 2014, and August 5, 
2014. This final sample included employees from diverse functional areas ranging from 
sales and marketing to legal, human resources, general management, and technical 
operations.  
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Data Collection 
The executives were interviewed using the full interview questionnaire (see 
Appendix B). All interviews were conducted by phone and were recorded via Vonage 
Business IP Telephony service directly into a computer MP3 file. Each call lasted 
between 57 and 85 minutes. Every individual either signed a consent form or gave his or 
her verbal consent at the start of the recorded call. No names were recorded; each person 
interviewed was given a code that was used for identification purposes during 
transcription. The recording file was sent via e-mail to the transcriber, who did not know 
the name of the person being interviewed. She transcribed the material using only the 
code provided. None of the officials interviewed had been indicted; most are currently 
working in other organizations, including other telecommunications and cable television 
companies. One person is retired. 
The questions that were asked in the interview were grouped into sections to 
parallel the sequence of the research questions (see Appendix B). Because all of the 
interview questions were open-ended in design, the interviewee often discussed other 
areas beyond the scope of this study. Although not directly responsive to the question 
posed, this extraneous material provided additional context overall. 
Nothing unusual or unexpected was encountered in the process of data collection. 
All interviewees were willing to participate, did so fully without problem, and no one 
dropped out. No bias was suspected; there was no incentive for specific results, and recall 
was consistent among all the participants.  
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Data Analysis  
 The data consisted of more than 500 pages of transcribed interviews. These 
transcripts were hand-sorted according to each interview question and hand-coded for 
specific themes around the research questions. An MS Word document was used to 
facilitate the sorting and coding process. Several key themes were found and the results 
are identified in tables in this section, organized by research question, and supported by 
specific quotes and stories told by the interviewees. 
 In analyzing the data, I found no variation in response by gender, reporting 
relationships, or functional areas within the firm. All individuals had direct contact to the 
Rigas family, and all were employed by Adelphia before and during the time of the 
collapse, so I did not find it necessary to sort the data in any way but by the comments the 
participants gave in response to the interview questions. Because the questions were 
open-ended, there was room for each individual to tell detailed stories to illustrate their 
comments. Several participants recalled specific moments at the firm that they said they 
had never discussed before. I categorized comments by topic, and then by similarity of 
examples given.  
As an explanatory case study, I wanted to understand why and how the Adelphia 
corruption and collapse occurred. A vivid picture evolved in the words of those 
interviewed that describes the culture and leadership of the firm, and forms a collective 
explanation of how and why fraud occurred at Adelphia Communications. As is 
presented in the Study Results section, six major themes evolved from the data. 
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Study Results 
Table 2 
 
RQ1: Why Did Leadership of Highly Regarded Adelphia Communications Make Massive 
Unethical Financial Decisions that Led to Corporate Collapse? 
Theme/behavior Explanation 
1. Family collective Company was ruled by one family, with the employees used as a means to 
the family’s ends. 
2. High control/low 
empowerment 
All decisions made and controlled centrally by the family. Employees 
often not allowed to make operational, financial, or hiring/firing decisions 
without approval of family member. 
3. Business comingling Family businesses and public businesses were not run separately. 
 
 
Theme 1: Family Collective 
 Adelphia Communications was run and operated by one family. It had been 
started as a family-owned private company and was managed as such for many years. 
According to the data, the transition to public company made little difference in the 
actual operations. Participants commented as follows regarding this theme: 
 They ran it like a family company when it was public. . . . Mr. Rigas was 
like everyone’s father. He had great concern for the people of the community so 
he wanted to invest in the community as much as in the company, improve the 
schools, etc. Probably 80% of Coudersport worked at Adelphia. From a bird’s eye 
view the whole place was like one big dysfunctional family. (Exec C) 
 The Rigases kind of controlled everything, so although they were good to 
you, you really weren’t going to go far unless your name was Rigas. . . Even 
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though the company was publicly traded, it was still pretty much family-owned 
and-operated. (Exec I) 
 The results showed that Adelphia was a family-run business. Its success and 
ultimate downfall had a great deal to do with the leaders’ ability to take risks and make 
decisions that might not otherwise be approved. Participants commented as follows 
regarding the mechanism of operations as a family business. 
Ultimately the [Rigas] family prospered and I think John [Rigas] thought 
the employees and the town people were extended family and he was the father, 
or grandfather, making the decisions that in his mind benefitted them the best. 
(Exec E)   
If Tim [chief financial officer] were not John’s [chief executive officer] 
son, John might have questioned what Tim was doing more. But there was a 
family trust among the Rigases, there’s (sic) a family bond, there’s belief in your 
son and you want him to do well and succeed, so maybe you give him more 
leeway than you would give to a [chief financial officer] that was not related, not 
in your family. (Exec B)   
As a family, they just trusted each other. I don’t think they sat around the 
table and said, “Hey guys, I’m scamming the company today and I did some off-
balance-sheet deals so we get more money.” I don’t believe there was scheming at 
the whole family level as there was at one primary level of the family. And the 
family just trusted each other. (Exec B) 
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After the initial public offering of stock, the Rigas family still held the top operating 
positions in the company and therefore maintained decision-making authority. Seats of 
the voting majority of the board of directors (six out of eight positions) were also 
occupied by the Rigas family. The fact that a family ran Adelphia had a cultural 
influence, as demonstrated in comments by the former executives interviewed: 
It was a quirky culture. I guess the best way to describe it was like a 
family. You had to be very accepting of everyone even if they did not deliver, 
because that is what you do in a family—you accept people’s flaws. And no one 
got fired. It was very rare. (Exec I)  
I never got an office and had to work in the conference room because 
Doris [John’s wife] wanted it to stay a conference room, and the family was not 
going to go against her wishes as a family member. There was an office available, 
but I was told that was the “family wing” and not available. (Exec D) 
 The family bond was something that was not to be questioned, both within the 
family and by the executives. The Rigas family trusted each other above all else. The 
former executives I interviewed commented about this family bond as follows: 
I was originally hired as chief [X] officer. On the day I started, they 
changed my title to senior vice president. As Michael Rigas told me, there was 
only going to be one chief in the company and it was John Rigas. So he did not 
want anyone else in the company outside the family to have “chief” in their title. . 
. . The leadership and decision making promised to me never happened. It had 
become clear that they were very unwilling to let someone outside of the family 
make any decisions. The family bond was the company. (Exec D) 
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It is possible that John, James, and Michael never knew the full extent of 
what was going on. Keep in mind they had their own silos to run. Michael ran 
operations and James ran the phone company, and when their brother would walk 
in and say, “Hey, sign this, we are refinancing,” they were not going to their own 
lawyers to sit down and comb through the documents. They trusted their brother. 
(Exec B) 
 The following story told by one former executive of Adelphia reveals the extent 
to which the family bond formed the firm, and the negative impact that was a result: 
I was hired by Jim Rigas directly, and as part of my responsibility, I oversaw a 
data center. The manager of the data center called me and said, “Hey, they’re 
asking me to do something and I am totally uncomfortable doing it. So if they 
want me to do it, I need it in writing.” So I told the manager to fax me the info.  
 
Well, apparently Tim [Rigas] had learned that the billing system would allow a 
disconnect flag on an account to go away after 180 days and show up again as 
current owed dollars. That was staggering, that they wanted to manipulate the 
books that way. I’ve never told this story to anyone except a few industry friends. 
So the manager took the document and wrote, “I will do this with the 
understanding that Tim Rigas agrees and is directing me to do this.”  
And I took this to one of our top accounting guys who said, “This is creepy,” and 
he took it to Jim Rigas. Jim got angry, livid, and went back to the accounting guy 
and said, “You NEVER question what my brother wants to do.” And that was the 
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end of it. The manager instituted the rule that the disconnect flags would drop off 
at 180 days. That family stuck by each other. (Exec A) 
 The theme of family loyalty and trust was strongly prevalent in every interview. 
The fact that the company was run by a family, and treated as a family, permitted the 
Rigases to enforce extreme control over the decisions of the organization. That high level 
of control and the resulting low empowerment of the staff is the second major theme in 
the data. 
Theme 2: High Control/Low Empowerment 
The research shows that, in the early days of the company, when it was 
structurally still a private family business, decisions were made as a group—around the 
Rigas dinner table. Because the family wanted to retain control, employees were not 
given much background or business insight into why decisions were being made. 
Following is a comment made by one of the former executives interviewed: 
There was no one to go to when you disagreed with things or had an issue. We 
were told to do something, but not why. Sometimes when I asked about 
something, I was told I didn’t need to know that: “Just get it done.” (Exec C) 
Adelphia was an extremely centralized, controlled operation. The Rigas family 
maintained complete control of most decisions, processes, and procedures of the 
company, including hiring, firing, training, and budgeting. Not only were the Rigases the 
core of the senior management team, but the family, including a son-in-law, comprised 
most of the board as well. Another former executive interviewed offered the following 
insight: 
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Adelphia was incredibly tightly controlled by the four Rigases, and the board of 
directors was controlled by the Rigases. . . . They were all strong libertarians and 
were the poster children for no intervention of any kind. . . . They were cowboys 
inventing their own way. . . . [The company was] highly centralized with 
micromanagement at the core. (Exec A) 
 Almost unanimously, the former officials cited the need of the family to control 
the company completely (fear of losing it), as well as the lack of boundaries between the 
family-run operation and the requirements of the public company, as major impediments 
to autonomous decision making. This created a path to the downfall of Adelphia. One of 
the former executives said, “The Rigases were committed to keeping control . . . you saw 
them bend rules to keep control. They sort of kept everything, you know, to themselves” 
(Exec B). 
 The control exhibited by the Rigas family extended to decision making in 
virtually every aspect of the organization. The family required that all major (and some 
not very major) decisions receive their personal approval. There was one cash 
management system (CMS) serving all areas of the firm; this single CMS allowed them 
to control all budgeting and spending across the entire organization (Johnson & Rudolph, 
2007). This centralized decision-making process also caused slowdowns and sometimes 
total inaction within the operating teams, as several former executives recounted to me: 
 The Rigases could not delegate decision making. Decisions were very, 
very centralized, so decision making was very slow. . . . Obviously, they pushed 
the envelope of what was allowable and John had to be aware of all that. John was 
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touted in the press after everything came out, as the confused old man, thinking he 
didn’t know how he got there. (Exec J) 
 They were micromanaging and controlling everything. . . . The place was 
highly centralized with micromanagement at its core. For example, something as 
mundane as figuring out the channel line-up, what channels the programs should 
appear on in what cable communities—let’s say there were 800 communities. 
Maybe it was double that. But Michael Rigas would make that decision, sitting in 
his office, poring over the channel line-up chart for every community in the 
United States. (Exec A) 
Exec G said, “The company was extremely centralized, with people in 
Coudersport making marketing decisions and programming decisions for the whole 
company with no knowledge of the specific market conditions.” Another former 
executive elaborated, 
 I ran a department but could make very few decisions. We did what John 
[Rigas] asked. So, if he said, “I want you to run recruitment ads in the 
newspaper,” I argued that ads had not proven successful and he said, “Run ’em 
anyway.” One weekend, he wanted to spend $30,000 on a weekend’s worth of 
ads. It was a tremendous waste of money. But he wanted to make the decision. I 
could give someone a $1 pay raise and he would be furious, but he thought these 
$30,000 ads made sense. (Exec I) 
There was very little autonomous authority for anything. It is common to 
go up the chain for authority, but at Adelphia it was extreme. For a large 
expenditure, say a new HR system, you would have to get buy-in from the family. 
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For a capital item, you could get approval from John [chief executive officer], but 
he would have to sell it in to Tim [chief financial officer]. So all the Rigases had 
to approve most things. Many things just died and never happened because the 
whole group could not agree. We knew we had to go to all of them so I would 
start meeting with John on a Saturday for items pertaining to the following week, 
because I had a list of things to get through and, without him, it would never 
happen. (Exec J) 
 Even executives who recognized the need to assign authority to their department 
heads and who attempted to put control in proper hands grew frustrated at the results, as 
this former executive recounted: 
 I tried to establish areas where decisions could be made. When I got there, 
every single capital purchase or expense report had to go through multiple people. 
Let’s say a technician had to use his credit card for gas, well, that technician 
would have to fill out an expense report, then the technician’s supervisor would 
sign it, the general manager would sign it, the regional manager would sign it, the 
vice president of the region would sign it, then it would go to the call center 
manager, then the head engineer would sign it, then it would come to me and I 
would sign it, and then I had to send it to Michael to be signed. There would be 
about 14 signatures for a $35 gas purchase.  
 So I suggested that for any purchase under $50, I could directly approve 
them without them going to Michael, and he agreed to give it a shot. . . . And then 
after a while he was, like, you know, “I feel I am out of touch with what’s 
happening with our front line,” and he wanted to see the supervisor’s written 
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comments on every CSR and wanted to validate that I was not just rubber-
stamping expenses. So his insistence on seeing all this caused almost every 
expense and payable to go through a 90-day delay before it was paid. (Exec D) 
 In retrospect, some of the former executives offered that the control was 
maintained to hide financial matters from the rest of the team: 
Now we know that all the hoops we went through to get expenses paid, the lack of 
increases to salaries, etc., in retrospect we know there was a cash crunch in the 
company because of the debt. And they had to control everything so we wouldn’t 
know that. (Exec D) 
 Equity ownership of the company was highly protected as well, which allowed 
the Rigases to control voting rights and decision making at the board level. But as the 
former executives I interviewed pointed out, giving up some ownership may have helped 
the family in the longer term, rather than hurting them:  
 The Rigases were committed to keeping tight control. They did not give 
out a lot of stock to employees. They kept everything to themselves. Listen, they 
could have taken $3 billion out of this company in stock options and paid, over 10 
years or so, $100 million a year in stock options to the Rigases as top executives 
and controlled the company through completely legal executive compensation 
measures, but they didn’t because, you know, they were just so fearful that if they 
gave out a bunch of stock to themselves, they would have to give it to others and 
then there would be big shareholders growing around them and they would lose 
control. (Exec B) 
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 The company was very centralized. It was transitioning from a mom-and-
pop business to a corporate entity. But the culture there was still a very mom-and-
pop approach to things. . . . A lot of people struggled with that. The three brothers 
and the father made most of the decisions and set the strategic direction. It was 
very controlled. . . . I think if they had been willing to give up some control to 
meet their debt obligations, in other words, sell enough stock to where they might 
not have been the majority owners, they probably would have avoided all the 
problems. (Exec F) 
Headquartered in Coudersport, PA, the rural location of the company isolated the 
family and may have allowed the problem of strong control to initially go unnoticed. The 
family and Adelphia became critically important to the survival of the town, and staying 
in Coudersport allowed the family to maintain control, to a point. One of the former 
executives said:  
[The company] just grew too fast. It grew too fast for them to maintain the kind of 
control they wanted. When you have to borrow a lot of money to grow, you do 
run the risk of giving up control to others, and they were very paranoid about 
losing control of the company, losing the ability to keep the company in 
Coudersport. If private equity came in, the investor might have preferred the 
company be in Pittsburgh or Buffalo or New York, and the Rigases were bent on 
keeping control and staying in Coudersport. (Exec B) 
 Even hiring and firing decisions at all levels across the country had to go through 
the family: 
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For any termination anywhere in the company, John wanted to review it. Even a 
technician in Los Angeles. So I had a list of, say, five terminations, and I would 
have to take it to John. Sometimes I had to do a termination before I got his 
approval. Woe be to me if I made a mistake. There were times he reversed my 
decision and reinstated the person, often just because he liked the guy, or felt 
sorry for him. (Exec J) 
These first two themes, the family as collective owner, and the highly centralized 
control and micromanagement of resources and processes, begin to demonstrate an 
environment in which poor decisions, even unethical decisions, might be able to flourish. 
In fact, during and after the trial, reporters from The New York Times, USA Today, and 
the The Wall Street Journal came to attribute the downfall of Adelphia to the absolute 
need of the family to control the decisions and the cash (Cauley, 2010; Johnson & 
Rudolph, 2007; Lowenstein, 2004).  Newspaper reports and court hearings also brought 
up the issue of the family comingling of business (the next theme) during the trial when 
this was discovered, but the fact that non- indicted employees had those insights was not 
probed. 
 The third theme, the comingling of the Adelphia public and Rigas personal 
businesses, added to the closely kept culture of withholding most corporate information 
from the staff, and only advances our understanding of why illegal financial decisions 
could easily have been—and were—made and even thrived in the Adelphia environment. 
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Theme 3: Comingling of Businesses 
The Rigases owned multiple businesses besides the cable business, both in 
Coudersport and elsewhere. When Adelphia Communications went public, the Rigases 
continued to run many things privately and, supposedly, separately from the public 
company. As it turned out, the businesses were often illegally comingled and managed 
from the one centralized CMS that had been established as they wished it to operate (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Example Rigas Family Expenses Financed Through CMS or Co-Borrowing Proceeds 
Receiving entity Ultimate owners of entity 
Amount received ($ 
millions) 
Dobaire Designs Adelphia paid this company, owned by Doris 
Rigas, for design services 
.371 
Wending Creek Farms Adelphia paid John Rigas’s farm for lawn care 
and snowplowing 
2  
SongCatcher Films Adelphia financed the product of a movie by 
Ellen Rigas 
3 
Eleni Interiors Adelphia made payments to this furniture store 
run by Doris Rigas and owned by John Rigas 
12  
The Golf Club at Wending 
Creek Farms 
Adelphia began developing a ritzy golf club 13  
Wending Creek 3656 Adelphia bought timber rights that would 
eventually revert to the Rigas family partnership 
26  
Praxis Capital Ventures Adelphia funded a venture capital firm run by 
Ellen Rigas’s husband, Peter Venetis 
65  
Niagara Frontier Hockey 
LP 
Adelphia underwrote the Rigases’ purchase of the 
Buffalo Sabres hockey team 
150  
Highland 2000 Adelphia guaranteed loans to a Rigas family 
partnership, which used the funds to buy stock 
1,000 
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Total  1,271,371 
 
 
Note. Adapted from Adelphia Communications Corp.’s Bankruptcy, by S. C. Gilson & B. 
Villalonga, 2010. Copyright 2010 by Harvard Business School. Used with permission.  
 
 The following multiple stories from those former executives I interviewed 
exemplify how the family did not change the rules of operation when Adelphia went from 
a private family-owned company to a public company with shareholders. 
 You have to remember this was a huge business to control. It generated 
billions of dollars in revenue. And it [the cable business] is sitting next to the 
private family-owned Adelphia phone company with its own employees; they [the 
separate businesses] were all sort of intermingled within the company. And then 
layer in a farming business that is sharing some of the Adelphia buildings, and a 
furniture business that John’s wife was running, and a mobile business. I assumed 
someone was accounting for all that, but at the end of the day, apparently they 
weren’t. But they were a nice family, and we just trusted them. Because of the 
close control the family had, very, very few people outside the family, maybe two 
to three others, knew anything was wrong. We could see a mess in the structure, 
but we had no idea what it really meant…  
 Fundamentally, you had a guy who ran a company that was privately held 
for 30 years, and then publicly traded for about 16. So he sort of developed habits 
of comingling things. You know, like the housing was a business in and of itself, 
and the farm was another. So everything got paid for out of this one account and, 
64 
 
for the first 30 years, it was no big deal. Then all of a sudden you’re publicly 
traded. Well John Rigas’s behavior never changed. I mean, they were all still 
comingled and the family business was the same as the public business, and you 
know, they thought, “No big deal.” (Exec B) 
 The problem was this was John’s company, and I don’t think he could 
ever let go of that. He saw it as his personal company, his private business that he 
built and owned. . . . Tim and others were, I do not know if sleazy is the right 
word, but willing to do things that I wouldn’t do, for example not separating the 
businesses. (Exec F) 
 We knew there were all these different businesses, and a group of us, and I 
swear this was before we knew anything was going on, we would joke like, “Oh 
you know, I work for Adelphia. They have three sets of books. One for Wall 
Street, one for the Rigases, and one that is real.” . . . It really felt like the company 
was run as a privately held business, there was nothing systematic, nothing 
structured like a corporation, and it did not feel like they had any fiduciary 
responsibility to anyone but themselves. (Exec H) 
 The board was pretty much family and individuals they knew well 
personally. There was no independence on the board from that standpoint. That 
hurt, especially in the case of a public company. You need people on the board 
who are willing to ask questions and willing to have a different point of view. 
This board was set up to protect each other, and would not say anything about the 
comingling of businesses. They forgot that this was a PUBLIC company. (Exec F) 
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One of the former executives I interviewed stated the problem in the simplest of 
terms: “This was a family that was greedy. The fact is they did not listen to or were not 
coached on how to take a company from private to public” (Exec C). Another former 
executive provided a more elaborate explanation: 
They didn’t understand the difference between a private company that served 
them[emphasis added], and a public company that served the 
shareholders[emphasis added]. . . or else they disregarded it. . . They would 
regularly say it was their prerogative as the owner to make a decision. I always 
thought, “But you are not the owner, it is a public company.” (Exec D) 
 The leaders of Adelphia blatantly did not separate their companies into private 
and public organizations; this action was an open door to fraud. The process of illegal 
comingling, coupled with a private family whose members ran everything with full 
control, created the foundation on which Adelphia Communications was built and 
managed. What showed up later in the  trial was that both the accounting firm and legal 
counsel, as well as the board of directors, let things slide and turned a blind eye, even as 
they knew things were not being accounted for properly (“SEC v. Adelphia,” 2004).  
Adelphia’s independent directors approved the “co-borrowing loans.” Adelphia’s 
outside auditor, Deloitte & Touche, did urge Adelphia to disclose them but 
acquiesced when Adelphia resisted. Adelphia’s longtime securities counsel, 
Buchanan Ingersoll, knew about the co-borrowings as well. Finally, investment 
banks floated billions of dollars of securities to the public with detailed 
descriptions of Adelphia’s finances which somehow neglected to mention the 
extra $3 billion of indebtedness. Even the SEC was aware that Adelphia and the 
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Rigas family let each other borrow on its own credit. . .  But the SEC never 
investigated it. (Lowenstein, 2004, para. 8). 
The family made decisions to benefit themselves because they were a close-knit 
and loyal family who believed the business they had grown was theirs alone. A clear 
picture of how they ran the company emerged in the first three themes. This picture may 
be understood further in the next two themes, which explain the ethical climate of the 
organization and why unethical decisions were either not seen or overlooked by those not 
in the family (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
 
 
RQ2: What Was the Ethical Culture and Climate at Adelphia and How did it Effect Unethical 
Behavior and Moral Disengagement? 
Theme/behavior Explanation 
4. Care for community and 
employees 
Company took care of those in the community and employees in need. 
5. Family entitlement High self-concept of “doing good” led to “acceptable dishonesty.” 
 
 
 The research revealed that the culture at Adelphia was generous on one hand and 
self-serving on the other hand. Themes emerged that indicate Adelphia was a community 
of both care and self-entitled smugness. 
Theme 4: Community/Employee Care 
Input from the former executives left little doubt that there was a culture of care at 
Adelphia for a certain category of people, and for the town. The Rigas family was seen 
by those interviewed as a caring family who brought new life to the town of Coudersport. 
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They offered jobs, upgraded the community, and knew many of the population by name. 
As one of the managers remarked, “The Rigases improved the community; they built a 
golf course, improved the school and hospital. They were like the royal family of the 
town, and the town prospered thanks to them” (Exec I). Another former executive 
commented, “The family was really welcoming and engaging. They lived in the same 
town with all the employees, so we saw them socially as well as professionally, and we 
knew each other’s family members, the wives and kids” (Exec G). Another executive 
explained the matter as follows: “They invested in the community because they had kids 
there, like making the school a good school. But everything was an extension of and 
function of the needs of their own, ultimately dysfunctional, family” (Exec C).  
Other former executives offered more elaborate answers: 
They really provided white-collar jobs in an area that was traditionally 
blue collar. Our traditional industries in Potter County were agriculture and 
logging and things like a small carbon plant. . . . They created the sort of jobs that 
were not in existence before Adelphia really grew, like accounting, legal, 
operations, and call center jobs. It was a big economic boost for Coudersport, but 
also for Potter County, McKeane County, Tioga County, all the way into 
Allegheny County…  
People drove to work from six or seven surrounding counties because 
there was no other employer of its kind in that area. They put in first-class 
buildings, and renovated ones that were there. . . . And, to be honest, they stayed 
in touch with the agriculture side of the county. They had beautiful farms that 
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they renovated, and they brought culture in. They brought in the Buffalo 
Philharmonic for Christmas. They had a big family picnic every year at the park. 
And for me (and some others), they bought me a house and allowed me to live in 
it. I think, when I left, they owned something like 160 houses, most of which 
housed employees. It helped to stabilize the real estate market, and made housing 
affordable for many people. (Exec B) 
The Rigas family and the family culture was one of the reasons that many people 
originally joined the firm. They had heard the Rigases were a caring family who treated 
people with dignity. But the Rigases valued loyalty to the family more than business 
performance, and a controlling family and its insertion into the minutia of the company 
created some disconnect in their attempt to “care” for employees. As one study 
participant explained the matter, “John Rigas would give out his home phone number to 
an employee. He cared about the people as if they were his own family, right down to the 
lowest level employee” (Exec F). Other former executives provided answers that were 
more expansive: 
It was known as a good family place to work. I joined the firm because the 
reputation was that the employees were treated fairly. And the employees would 
be listened to and helped, you know, those employees who needed it. I think there 
was a good reputation there for Adelphia and the family. Even when it went 
public it had a “mom and pop” mentality. (Exec E) 
They never fired anyone. In fact they gave jobs to almost anyone in the 
community who wanted one. . . . But interestingly, the Rigases did not value 
people on their performance or their competence. They valued people on their 
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loyalty and their length of seniority to the company and were very vocal about it 
in those words. They protected those people but did not reward those of us trying 
to perform well. (Exec D) 
They hated confrontation of any kind and so the ability to talk through 
anything to resolution was totally dysfunctional. Yet the family always stepped in 
where they shouldn’t have. Here’s an example. An employee working in another 
state would send an e-mail to John Rigas and say. “My supervisor yelled at me 
today and it made me feel bad.” And John Rigas would get on the plane and go 
meet that employee the next morning. So every employee had 100% access and 
could bypass their supervisor, or HR. From the Rigases’ point of view, they 
thought they were making it a caring place to work and valuing the employees. 
But it was chaos. (Exec D) 
Everyone joked about Rigas standard time. John would call a meeting and 
you would often have to wait anywhere from 1 to 3 hours for it to take place. 
Then the discussion might never get to the business issue and could center on 
getting the employee’s second cousin into Cornell. There were rabbit trails 
everywhere, incoherent and unstructured, and HR could never be part of solving 
an issue. (Exec G) 
They weren’t a Greek mafia or anything like that. They were not 
gangsters. They were good, honest, and salt of the earth . . . and they wanted to be 
in a rural area because they valued those, sort of those rural values. They didn’t 
want to move to a big city. They encouraged us to go to lunch in the community 
and spread our money around, and support local initiatives. (Exec A) 
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They flew people to the Mayo Clinic to get health care, something those 
people could not have done on their own. I had an employee who broke her 
vertebrae. She had worked for the company 60 days and she wasn’t even eligible 
for health care at the point she flipped her car in the winter. And they paid the 
$54,000 to helicopter her to Philadelphia and bring her back, and all of her 
treatment. So there are many things I can cite that they did to go above and 
beyond and treat people like good neighbors. (Exec A) 
Although the family showed unusual care for some people, it was clear to some 
people that this unusual care was both self-serving as well as caring. This culture 
underscored the role that the Rigas family structure played in the company, with John as 
the paternal head and the employees as his children, as the following stories demonstrate. 
John’s daily world was the kingdom[emphasis added] of Coudersport. I 
say that sarcastically but he was somewhat of royalty there and I was in meetings 
where he would say, “Okay, the 4th of July Coudersport fireworks this year, 
Adelphia is sponsoring it, and we need to make sure this family serves the ham 
because they are falling short on paying our rent, and we need to let this family 
get the baskets.” . . . But then at the same time, John would say, “You know, I 
think I should be given the key to the city, it’s time, and I would like somebody to 
present that suggestion.” (Exec D) 
I’m pretty cynical, but I always felt there was this position they took that 
Adelphia and the Rigases were this wonderful loving family that embraced and 
took care of you and really cared about the people that worked there, and that was 
sort of the front. That was the mask they wore. But the reality was they didn’t care 
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about anybody. They only cared about, you know, making money. . . . When the 
company first started, I suspect it was genuine, but over time, they got bigger . . . 
they no longer operated it that way. To me, there was always this feeling of 
contrast and conflict. What they SAID they were was very different from HOW 
they really were. (Exec H) 
I was behind closed doors and able to see some of the arrogance that was 
not seen outside that door. And I got to see that there was a whole lot of agenda 
behind some of the good things that they liked to be noted for. You know, there 
was such a sense of evil that I really felt. It wasn’t just incompetence or 
ignorance. There was a self-servingness to it all. (Exec D) 
It is interesting that they always took care of the downtrodden, the front 
line of people who needed it most. They did really good things for the truly 
needy. That came from John. I remember Tim saying his father was weighing 
them down with his good deeds, like the time John hired a local handicapped 
person to help run errands. He would hang around the family part of the office 
and stay for hours. But Michael and John wanted to help people. If a relative of an 
employee died, Michael would always go to the funeral, wherever it was. Michael 
was the true humility of that family, there was no self-servingness; he did it to 
truly exhibit care. But interestingly if there was a more senior manager out there 
who needed something, they had no compassion for those people. They felt they 
were able to take care of themselves. So they helped the front line, but often at the 
expense of the supervisors. (Exec D) 
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These former Adelphia executives’ words speak volumes about the culture and 
leadership style during their tenure at the company. While the concept of care was 
important to the Rigases, they felt entitled to dole out the care to those who, in their view, 
were most needy. They acted as the royalty in the kingdom, looking over their subjects 
and determining their fate. Much of the “good” that the family did was perceived 
differently by the courts later on. Reporters attending court hearing wrote that John Rigas 
used Adelphia as a personal “piggy bank” to fund projects of his own interest, like the 
local golf course that they wanted to build, supposedly for the community (Cauley, 2007; 
Lowenstein, 2004). Although the golf course was never fully built, it would have cost 
shareholders more than $15million and additionally raised more money for the Rigas 
family because it was to have been built on their land. This theme of entitlement was the 
fifth major prominent theme revealed from the data.  
Theme 5: Entitlement 
 The community of Coudersport generally thought of the Rigas family as entitled 
royalty. John Rigas employed many of the townspeople, developed new housing and 
small businesses, and helped the town to flourish. He was everyone’s best friend, and 
there were few who did not know him well enough to say “Hello” when they saw him. 
Because the family did so much good for the employees of Adelphia and for the 
community, an aura of entitlement flourished within the family, as if they were the ruling 
royalty, with John filling the role of king, and all others in the community serving as 
subjects of the Rigas realm. To the Rigases, their entitlement meant that they were above 
reproach and were not to be questioned. Former executives offered several comments to 
support this theme. 
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 If you were told, “Mr. Rigas would like to see you in his office,” it was 
like being called to the principal’s office. There was this weird aura of “We are 
the kings of this fiefdom and you have to do what we say.” And, in all honesty, I 
think that was the demise of the company. It was public, but run like a private 
family and sometimes like a dictatorship. I was often told to do something and if I 
asked why, the answer was, “This is what the Rigases want. Don’t ask why. Just 
do it.” (Exec C) 
 The town would see John Rigas hold court in the local diner where 
employees would line up to meet with him, like he was king. He was never on 
time, [and] so you had to sit and wait your turn. (Exec D)  
 There was an old hotel in town, the Crittendon, old 1800s-looking place. 
There was no way [that hotel] could stay alive in that town when they never really 
rented any rooms and just had sort of a bar and restaurant. Well, John was giving 
them a subsidy, so we could do business with them. He did that for a few places 
in town. The guy was king. Whatever he said, went. (Exec I) 
 We just trusted them. I mean, they were nice. Mr. Rigas was a really nice 
guy. Michael was a really nice guy. We just assumed all the stuff we didn’t know 
was being taken care of. It was sort of assumed the family had rights to a certain 
amount of authority and control, and the staff and the community were treated 
well, so no one questioned the family. If anyone knew the whole scheme beyond 
the family, there were very, very few. I only know of two who knew what that 
whole mess meant, Jim Brown [VP of finance reporting to Tim Rigas] and 
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Michael Mulcahey [former VP and assistant treasurer]. And they were indicted 
with the Rigases. (Exec B) 
The Rigas family expected people to do as they said without question, and that 
expectation often extended the people in the town as well as the people in the company. 
Anyone who was not a member of the Rigas family by birth or marriage was there to 
serve the family. Former executives said, 
 I knew the Rigas family both inside and outside the office. They were one 
and the same in the office and in the community, the two areas just melded 
together. I have three kids and their pediatrician was Jim Rigas’s wife. I coached 
their kids’ softball team for a little while. We went to the same church as the 
Rigas family. . . . The Rigas family ran both the business at Adelphia and, in a 
way, he ran the whole town! (Exec C) 
 I started questioning the ethics of the company when I spent time with the 
family. One time, Tim Rigas said to me, “Why is it that operations is always 
asking what is happening? You know, if they would just go out and do their work 
they would all be fine.” That was a red flag to me, because I was wondering to 
myself, “Are you telling them the truth or are they just patsies, or what?”  
 One time, Tim also said, “Well, we do have a board of directors, but we 
tell them what to do.” I also would hear about things like the company plane 
taking toilet paper and a Christmas tree to the daughter in New York City, and 
even more bizarre, things like Doris calling one of my work associates at 6 a.m. 
and having him bring fresh donuts to the house. It was like they just expected 
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everyone to think we were there just to serve them, regardless of our company 
role. (Exec D) 
 The whole town was owned by the Rigases—everything—and everyone 
was beholden to them. The townspeople were like slaves; it was a slave 
environment. Most of the people worked for the Rigases, but they also lived in 
houses owned by the Rigases. It was so incestuous. (Exec H) 
 Once Adelphia was under scrutiny and the family members were indicted, the 
entitlement and control they showed in managing the community was often written about. 
The fact was that out of $564,000 in tax receipts collected by the town of Coudersport, 
Adelphia accounted for over 40% of it (Lowenstein, 2004). With all the comments about 
how entitled the Rigas family was, how controlling, how loyal to each other, why was 
financial fraud not more obvious to the employees, especially at the senior level? The 
final theme in the research addresses how the leadership could hide fraud within the 
culture they created (see Table 5).  
Table 5 
 
RQ3: How Were Employees Drawn into Supporting, Ignoring, or Initiating Unethical 
Behavior? 
Theme/behavior Explanation 
6. Blind obedience and loyalty Lack of control or empowerment resulted in powerless employees with 
unwitting support for actions of family. 
 
 
Theme 6: Blind Obedience 
The research reveals that the lack of authority in decision making and budget 
oversight, as well as the control and entitlement in place, resulted in a subservient 
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employee base with little, if any, knowledge of the inner workings of the financial state 
of the company, or how the various businesses were run and accounted for. Most 
employees were blindly loyal, doing what they were asked to do, right up until the fateful 
investor phone call in 2002 that started the unraveling of the company. We know now, 
after the trial, that a small group of executives in the financial group, reporting to Tim 
Rigas, participated in the fraud and were indicted, but broader knowledge as to how 
massive the fraud actually was, did not seem to penetrate to other senior executives 
outside the finance group. The executives interviewed stated that while they suspected 
things were not being done properly in the accounting area, there was no indication of the 
massive co-borrowings, cash manipulation, and false documentation that was produced 
and maintained. Despite being questioned at length by SEC attorneys and State of 
Pennsylvania attorneys, no senior executives beyond that small group of financial 
executives were indicted. Why did the senior-level employees at Adelphia not know 
more and say something? Former executives offered the following insights: 
 When you first join a company, you know only what you have been told 
by others. You do not have the benefit of your own eyes and ears. And employees 
today are burdened by a great deal of  responsibility in their day-to-day tasks, so 
really, to see a company transparently is not something that you have the time to 
do or that you even think to do. At Adelphia, there was no place to go, no one to 
turn to, if you had a grievance. If someone truly found out that the Rigases were 
doing something wrong and it was brought to their attention, it would be like, 
“That’s not your concern; sit down, shut up, and wear beige.” We were supposed 
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to blend in and do our job. And most people were just not going to stand up to 
them. We just figured it was not our business and we should do our job. (Exec C) 
 I don’t think anyone in the company other than a handful knew we might 
be participating in something that was ultimately a crime. The company was just 
so huge and so comingled, and we thought, “Well, everything must be getting 
double- and tripled-checked somewhere by the accountants, so let’s just do all this 
as if it is all married together and it will get checked.” It turned out not to be the 
case. (Exec B) 
 You have rules for a reason. Pushing the edge just because you have 
gotten away with it before does not justify the action. The company has an 
obligation to its people, a duty. There were people at Adelphia who could have 
stepped out and said something. But if their boss [a Rigas family member] told 
them to do something, they felt they were doing the right thing by being loyal. It 
falls into the category, “I am a good employee and I do what I am told to do.” 
(Exec J) 
The Aftermath 
While the employees interviewed blindly followed the leaders, three of the 
Rigases—John, Michael, and Tim—along with two others in the inner circle of the 
financial department were indicted, and the company filed for bankruptcy protection. 
Ultimately Adelphia sold its cable properties to Time Warner Inc. (TWX) and Comcast 
Corp. (CMCSA, CMCSK) for cash and stock, and dissolved (Adelphia Communications 
Corp., 2006).   
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John Rigas and Tim Rigas were found guilty of personally pocketing more than 
$2 billion and misleading investors about it. John was given a term of 15 years in prison 
and Tim received 20 years. As of early 2015, Tim and John remain in prison. 
Michael Rigas was acquitted in 2004 of conspiracy and wire fraud charges, but 
the jury deadlocked on charges of bank fraud and securities fraud. The bank fraud 
charges against him were later dismissed by prosecutors, but he was given home 
confinement for 10 months for pleading guilty to one count of making a false entry in a 
company record (“Son of Adelphia Founder,” 2006). Michael oversaw Adelphia 
operations but had very little interaction with the financial group. 
James Rigas had left the company in the 1990s to run a separate telecom company 
and was not charged. Michael Mulcahey, the Assistant Treasurer who reported to Tim 
Rigas, was acquitted in the criminal investigation, but in the fraud trial the judge stated, 
“I fully accept that Mulcahey was not the architect of the fraud. He was, however, a 
critical participant who enabled the fraud. He was not duped. He is knowledgeable, 
experienced and reasonably savvy” (“Judge Finds Ex-Adelphia Executive,” 2006, p. 1). 
A permanent injunction against future securities law violations was entered against him, 
but Mulcahey escaped prison time.  
James Brown, the Vice President of Finance, pleaded guilty to fraud as part of a 
plea deal to avoid prison time, and became the star witness at the Rigas trial. He testified 
against the family and stated that he made false entries in the books for the family. He 
also stated under oath that the family lied to banks to avoid loan defaults, keeping the 
accurate results in a second set of books (“Plea Deal of Witness,” 2004). 
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Tim Werth, an accounting director reporting to Michael Mulcahey, pleaded guilty 
and also testified against the family. Werth’s ex-wife, Karen Chrosniak, also agreed to 
testify for the government, and told the jury that Timothy Rigas ordered her to understate 
Adelphia debt and overstate its subscribers. Chrosniak said, “It was wrong to prepare 
news releases and investor materials with phony numbers. But I didn't want to confront 
Tim” (“Ex-Employee Tells of Lies,” 2004). Neither Tim Werth nor Karen Chrosniak 
were given jail time. 
In addition to those members of the family and the financial team mentioned 
above, there were other people outside the firm in a clear position to prevent what 
happened. As noted earlier, the board of directors approved the co-borrowing of loans. 
Reports indicate that the outside accounting firm Adelphia used, Deloitte & Touche, did 
advise the Rigases to disclose the loans but the family refused, and Deloitte & Touche did 
not force the issue (Lowenstein, 2004). Apparently, even the SEC was aware that 
Adelphia allowed the family to borrow on its own credit and did not investigate it, and 
their securities counsel, also aware, kept mum about the actions (Lowenstein, 2004). 
Outside legal and accounting resources to the firm became enablers when they failed to 
insist on strict legal controls. Interestingly, once the debt was brought to light in that 
fateful earnings call, the accountants suddenly refused to approve the quarterly reports 
and their recent audit ( which had not yet been signed), the law firm refused to represent 
Adelphia, several members of the board resigned, and the SEC investigation began 
(“SEC Charges Deloitte & Touche,” 2005). 
Questioned for their lack of proper auditing ( “SEC Charges Deloitte & Touche,” 2005), 
Deloitte & Touche settled with the SEC, paying $50 million without any admission or 
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denial of guilt, but stating that Adelphia had deceived them as well as the shareholders 
(Hurtado, 2012). Most of the executives interviewed for this study voiced their personal 
opinion that Deloitte & Touche should have been further sanctioned because the auditors 
played a significant role in the company downfall. Particularly in light of the recent 
Enron scandal, and the fact that Enron’s auditors, Arthur Andersen, had been indicted just 
recently, it seems that paying the fee may have been a relatively light sentence for 
Deloitte. 
Shareholders of Adelphia lost billions when the stock fell and was delisted. In 
2004, after the trial of John and Tim Rigas, the government demanded that the family 
return the family’s securities (never properly paid for) and their separately owned cable 
systems (purchased with funds wrongfully taken from Adelphia) to Adelphia, (which was 
then being managed by a new team and was going through bankruptcy proceedings. The 
new executive management team took over all operations when the Rigas family left the 
firm, and proceeded to manage the company through the disposition of all assets; 
however, they never worked with the family and therefore were not relevant to this study. 
In return for those assets, Adelphia agreed to create a victim fund in cash and securities 
of more than $700 million (U.S. Department of Justice, Southern District of New York, 
2004). This case represents “the largest single distribution of forfeited assets to victims in 
Department of Justice history” (“$728 Million Returned,” 2012, para. 2).  
The people of Coudersport were both suprised and saddened. But the rest of the 
Rigas family still lives there. After the trial, although most of the privately owned cable 
systems of the family were surrendered to the government, two small systems serving 
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approximately 4,000 customers remained. James and Michael Rigas, and a team of 
former Adelphia employees, have now built that customer base into a small company 
with 35,000 customers in 12 states. They named the company Zito Media in honor of 
their father’s Greek heritage (Gilliland, 2012). 
The shock and sadness over this series of events was palpable in the voices of 
those interviewed. Many of them had not engaged in an in-depth discussion of their years 
at Adelphia in more than 10 years. All looked at their experience decidedly, with 
hindsight and knowledge gained over time. While none of the people interviewed were 
accused of any crime, several were called in for questioning and were interviewed by 
SEC and criminal attorneys. Here is what they had to say in retrospect about why they so 
blindly followed the Rigas family and about their time as an Adelphia employee:  
 I found it odd the amount of worship I felt people gave the Rigas family, 
locally in the community, as well as in the company. The Coudersport people, you 
know, they felt like the Rigases could do no wrong and were worthy of the praise. 
It was bizarre. I had never seen people worshipped. It was almost like they were 
celebrities like Britney Spears or the Beatles; they were above human. There are a 
whole myriad of things I have learned from this. Life is linear and you have a 
certain number of years in your career, and if you blindly give loyalty to a person 
or an organization, you have to be careful. I tend to be loyal and I tend to be a 
crusader in work, and try to do what I do for the sake of the people I work for. But 
you have to step back and assess once in a while. (Exec J)  
 The family was treated without judgment, you know, “A Rigas said it, so 
it must be right.” Even when it was falling apart, no one questioned them. Tim 
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could say anything, it’s almost like he wrote the dictionary, you know? And I 
would just look at these people, like, “You’ve got to hear the words that are being 
said, you can’t just look at this person and think all is good. The words are 
knocking this house of cards down.” (Exec D) 
 I was surprised by the strongly supported theme of blind obedience demonstrated 
in the two quotes by Exec J and Exec D. I had thought I might find someone who had 
considered whistleblowing; that was not the case. The fact that no one outside the finance 
group knew the extent of the problems, or ignored the possibility, was a surprise. People 
trusted the family, even though they were not allowed to see the decision making, the 
internal workings, or the internal financial reports of the firm. While all those interviewed 
agreed that the entitlement and family control was massive, they still trusted the family. 
Although there seemed to be concern that various businesses and their finances were 
comingled, and no one outside of the family was empowered in any way to take action, 
loyalty was required to survive at Adelphia. And while many found the family behavior 
and business methods odd, no one I spoke with suspected anything of the massive fiscally 
irresponsible and criminal nature that ultimately was revealed. 
 Regarding the lack of controls by outside auditors and counsel, this phenomenon 
reflects common practice of the times. The financial implosion of Enron had literally just 
occurred and was dominating the news, and Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd-Frank did not yet 
exist. Tight external controls were not in place to oversee fiscal accountability and 
prevent fraud of this magnitude. These regulations and actions came later. What is 
interesting is that, now that regulations and policies and procedures are in place, we still 
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have massive fraud, as stated in an annual review of corporate fraud in America 
published on www.financierworldwide.com: 
The volume of reported corporate fraud, bribery and corruption cases continues to 
rise at an alarming rate. This is quite surprising given the scrutiny of regulatory 
authorities, the heightened level of awareness of the potentiality of corporate 
fraud and the increasing role of external auditors to detect material misstatement 
in the financial records of public companies resulting in fraud or error. In a recent 
case, corporate fraudsters orchestrated a Ponzi scheme that resulted in a loss to 
investors of nearly $1bn. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a 
number of other significant corporate fraud schemes were discovered in 2014 
including the founder of Bixby Energy Systems who was sentenced to 300 
months in prison and ordered to pay nearly $60m in restitution as a result of a 
Ponzi scheme involving the offer of company securities. (Wilson, 2015, para. 2) 
 More recently there has been an increased participation of auditors in finding 
fraud (Wilson, 2015). That was not the case when the Rigases’ fraud occurred at 
Adelphia and this change is a welcome sign. Further discussion of the lack of oversight 
by outsde auditors and legal entities is provided in Chapter 5. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness  
Credibility 
The data for this study consisted of stories in the exact words of ten executives 
who were employed by Adelphia before, during, and, in some cases, after its downfall. 
These data are their personal recollections. I expected some variation in thinking among 
the participants; however, the comments all fit into the total picture without any major 
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opposing perceptions. Public records (e.g., newspaper articles, SEC documents, court 
transcripts) were used to triangulate the events and the outcomes. No documents were 
found to question the results found, although some might question if those interviewed 
were all so totally ignorant. It seems that most executives suspected things were not run 
well, were sloppy, but no one, other than the small group that was indicted,  knew the 
family had stolen billions of dollars. No one  became a whistle blower, and few left the 
company. Employee turnover was low because the company was successful on paper,  
there were not many opportunities in cable at the time, and the company was in an 
extremely remote location with few local options.  
No one interviewed spoke with fear; the statute of limitations for any further 
indictment (10 years) has long passed and the executives in this study seemed happy to 
tell their stories openly. In terms of possible bias during the recalling of events, recall 
bias would show either an exaggeration or an under-reporting of the facts being recalled, 
which would have been much more likely in conversations with the Rigas family 
themselves. In this case, however, we have ten people who recalled the leadership style 
and culture of Adelphia in great detail, and whose words all tell the same story. As a 
result of the assurances against falsehoods or risk of harm, and high consistency of the 
recall of the culture and management style, there is little reason to question the credibility 
of the data. 
Transferability 
The results of this one study are not necessarily transferable to other companies 
that have experienced corporate fraud because these stories represent the personal 
experiences of executives who were at one specific company run by one specific family. 
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However, the themes that revealed themselves are worthy of future exploration for 
possible transferability in areas such as centralized control, entitlement, employee 
loyalty, and the circumstances leading to blind obedience rather than to whistleblowing. 
Why people do not “blow the whistle” is multifaceted, but one key reason is that half to 
two-thirds of those who do it lose their jobs, and have a very difficult time getting hired 
elsewhere (Alford, 2001). All of these themes are topics that can be tested across many 
organizations. Possible future research opportunities on the themes explored in this study 
are addressed in Chapter 5. 
Dependability 
Dependability was established through triangulation with court records and SEC 
documents, as well as through finding corroboration among the 10 former executives of 
Adelphia interviewed for this study.  
Confirmability 
To establish confirmability, I needed to be self-reflexive and thereby assess my 
role in the trustworthiness of the analysis and interpretation of the data. While the 
interview questions were open-ended, I took care to listen carefully, hear any expression 
of emotion and take that characteristic into account, and not to engage in any 
conversation that might show a personal opinion or thought.  
Summary  
The results defined several key characteristics and themes in the culture and 
leadership at Adelphia Communications. Through the interviews and resulting stories of 
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the executives who were there, the researcher was able to explore personal insights into 
the collapse of the corporation. 
There is no question as to whether fraud was committed at Adelphia. That 
condition was an assumption going into the research, based on the fact that two members 
of the Rigas family were sent to prison for crimes. The research questions probed why 
and how that fraud could happen, especially in a company that was well regarded, and 
worth, at one time, multiple billions of dollars. The study also asked how the senior team 
may have participated in some way. The data consisted of interviews with senior 
executives, from which six major themes were revealed that helped to answer the 
research questions, and which ultimately provided an explanation for the downfall of 
Adelphia. Nearly every story or comment fell into one of the six themes, summarized 
below, and combined give a clear picture of the culture and leadership of Adelphia that 
lead to its collapse. 
 First, the company was run solely by one family. There was no objectivity of 
board oversight. There was no objectivity in the C-level suite. There was, instead, 
secretive and parental-like management. 
 Second, there was high control by the family and low empowerment given to 
staff. All decisions were made centrally by the family. Department heads were not 
empowered or involved in budgets, and a central cash system was used to pay all bills 
across the organization. Hiring and firing had to be approved through family, often 
exclusively by John Rigas. Control extended to the community as well. 
Third, the practice existed of comingling all businesses under one Adelphia 
umbrella. The Rigas family had multiple businesses that were comingled by management 
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team, location, and accounting methods. These inappropriate operational and fiscal 
matters were overlooked and, in some instances, even condoned by the board (which was 
also controlled by the family) and outside accounting and legal counsel.  
          Fourth, a culture of care existed for Adelphia employees and the Coudersport 
community. There was unusual care for staff members who experienced medical crises or 
personal problems. The Rigases were proud of their prominent role in the care and 
growth of the community. Their caring sometimes hid self-serving behavior and serves as 
an explanation for their belief that they were acting morally. 
 Fifth, there was a high level of entitlement by the family. The Rigases behaved as 
royalty over their subjects. They appreciated loyalty in their employees over performance 
and rewarded those who were loyal above all others. 
 Sixth, most executives were powerless, and showed blind obedience to the Rigas 
family. Loyalty without question was highly prevalent, based on the leadership style. The 
fraud was able to be contained and controlled within the finance team of Tim Rigas, 
whose members had little interaction with staff in other functional areas of the company, 
and who were likely unaware of the actions being undertaken in the name of maintaining 
the tight, secretive control of Adelphia by members of the Rigas family. 
These conversations with former executives gave a clear picture of the company 
culture that only those who worked there would know and be able to describe. They may 
or may not be similar to conversations one might have with past executives of Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, Health South, or the myriad of other corrupt or possibly corrupt 
companies during the Enron Era.  Adelphia was chosen as representative of those many 
88 
 
companies that went through similar fraud and criminal investigation, but it was unique 
in its family control, small town environment, and emphasis on loyalty.  
Other firms may have had comparable unique situations that allowed fraud to take 
place, which is something that could be further explored in new research. Research has 
shown that there were similar themes in other corruption cases (J. Cohen et al., 2011). 
For example, family ties were shown to have a part in fraud at Rite Aid and ImClone, and 
tight close control at Computer Associates, Dynegy, Enron, MicroStrategy, and 
WorldCom. The failure of outside auditors to speak up was also mentioned as an issue at 
Tyco, Merck, Delphi, and Halliburton (J. Cohen, et al., 2011). It remains to be seen, with 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and later Dodd-Frank Act, that the matter of 
outside auditors not speaking up is a matter that is no longer a common occurrence.   
All participants told their stories thoroughly, willingly, and, in fact, eagerly. Their 
combined stories, while personal to each participant, painted a broad and consistent 
picture of cultural and leadership issues that contributed to fraud and corporate ruin, and 
that have shown to partially support the two theories of ethical culture and moral 
disengagement that were used as a theoretical framework for the study. The conclusions 
and support of the framework are interpreted and analyzed further in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the ethical culture and leadership of 
Adelphia Communications Corporation and to answer why and how a successful public 
company could be overrun by fraud to the point of bankruptcy and total collapse. The 
research indicated that the major factors to perpetration of fraud within Adelphia included 
the family structure of the management team, a lack of empowerment given to the 
nonfamily executives, and a comingling of personal and public entities, revealing a lack 
of family acknowledgment that the company went from private to public.  
Interpretation of Findings by Research Question 
The research revealed that the culture of Adelphia was one in which fraud could 
and did thrive. Despite the true culture at the firm being one in which this type of crime 
was perpetrated, a primary reason the participants gave for joining the company 
originally was the high level of positive reputation each executive believed Adelphia and 
the Rigas family exhibited. From the outside, the company looked like a caring, hard-
working, honest organization. The organizations under the Adelphia Communications 
umbrella were growing by leaps and bounds, building successful operations, and giving 
back to the local community (personal communications, execs A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, 
and J). As Exec B remarked, “They had a big family picnic in the park every year, and 
the quality of life, if you enjoy small-town life, was good.” Exec C echoed this sentiment, 
saying, “I joined the company because of their huge and successful growth at the time. 
And cable was experiencing huge changes, which were exciting.” Exec E said, “We were 
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the biggest employer in this small town, and the company was growing. We had the cable 
operations, and the business systems, and the employees were treated well” (Exec E).  
They had acquired a bunch of new properties and I was to help them take 
it to the next level. I felt I could provide some economies of scale and some return 
on the investment for their acquisitions. It was exciting. (Exec D) 
[Adelphia] was a major player in the telecommunications space. I believe 
they were about $5.3 billion at that time. They were going through a major 
restructuring and looking at how they managed their call centers, sales, customer 
service, and they wanted to bring in more outside people with senior level 
experience and that intrigued me. (Exec F) 
Each person I spoke to had joined Adelphia during the 1990’s or early 2000’s 
while the company was highly thought of and growing fast.  The following sections offer 
an interpretation of the findings of the study and how they connect with the theoretical 
framework by each research question. 
Research Question 1  
Research Question 1 was, “Why did the leadership of the highly regarded 
Adelphia Communications make unethical financial decisions that led to corporate 
collapse?” As the company became a public company, the added pressure of Wall Street 
expectations was a possible incentive to show false numbers in their accounting. 
However, it was the Rigases’ greed that caused the fraud. When the company was 
private, they could take money out for whatever they wanted. Supporting the community 
also meant supporting themselves, and they were used to the personal enrichment and 
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notoriety that came with having the biggest company in the town. They needed to 
continue to have funds to support their personal lifestyle, even when the company went 
public. 
As the research revealed, there were several major issues at Adelphia that allowed 
the fraud to take place and go relatively unnoticed: (a) it was a family-controlled 
business, which allowed the fraud to be contained at the top level; (b) it was highly 
centralized in its operational decision making, providing very low levels of empowerment 
to the staff, again allowing fraud to be undetected at lower levels; and (c) the family 
ignored the principles of running a publicly traded company by financially comingling 
their personal businesses. The theoretical framework of moral disengagement seems 
likely to have played a role at Adelphia.  
Moral disengagement allows individuals with high self-concept to eliminate any 
personal blame for their actions and allows dishonesty to occur without feelings of guilt 
(Bandura, 1986). The stories recounted as part of data collection portrayed a family led 
by a man who saw himself as extraordinarily generous, with a moral obligation to help 
the community, take care of sick employees, and provide jobs to those who wanted them. 
At the same time, he also felt entitled to use company assets for his own personal benefit 
and gain. The fast growth of the company to billions in revenue, along with the needs of 
the Rigas family to feel important and control the company and the community, allowing 
greed and moral disengagement to prevail. They excused the things they were doing by 
saying they helped others, and proceeded personally benefit without guilt or remorse, a 
clear sign of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986).  
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Moral disengagement can be a form of self-deception (Mazar et al., 2008). The 
research shows the Rigas family, or at least some of them, may have believed their intent 
was moral. They deceived themselves by thinking they were helping others, while they 
helped themselves. Despite their beliefs, ethical fading, as described by Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (2004), seemed to be involved; the Rigas family excused their own actions or 
put a positive spin on many of them. Had the board of directors been more diligent (and 
not controlled by family), and had the accounting firm taken a stand on the lack of proper 
financial reporting, there could have been much stronger financial oversight, possibly 
recognizing some of the escalating instances of moral disengagement and preventing the 
fraud from taking place at all. As one of the executives remarked, “Clearly, controlling 
the board of directors was a MAJOR failing on their part. As much as they feared losing 
it, they lost the whole thing because they were unwilling to build in dissention at the 
board level”. (Exec A) 
Certainly the Rigas family loved success, power and control, and they apparently 
felt they were entitled to all proceeds of the public company they had originally built as a 
private firm. The financial department was controlled by Tim Rigas, who, with two key 
executives, masterminded the manipulation of the financial reporting. While they 
continued to state their innocence after being arrested, it is clear that there was a team in 
Tim’s group who knew what was going on and decided to participate.  
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was, “What was the ethical culture and climate at Adelphia 
and how did it affect unethical behavior and moral disengagement?” 
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 Ethical climate was part of the theoretical framework of this study. Victor and 
Cullen (1988) stated that ethical climates have three levels of ethical theory: egoism, 
benevolence, and principle. A principled climate is one in which leaders make decisions 
based on ethical codes and rules, which the leaders of Adelphia definitely did not do. A 
benevolent climate is one in which leaders take others into consideration in decision 
making. While the leaders of Adelphia tried to show benevolence to certain groups of 
employees, leadership stopped short of allowing others to participate in major decisions. 
Instead, the findings revealed a climate of egoism and self-serving behavior, with the 
employees obediently adhering to the decisions of a few powerful and controlling 
leaders.  
In contrast to the culture at Adelphia, a true ethical culture reflects “the collective 
ethical values and behaviors of all employees, managers and leaders” (Gebler, 2006, p. 
337). The findings are that the culture was one of control, power, and entitlement by the 
managing family. Although efforts were made to show care for those in need in both the 
company and the community, the majority of the executives believed that even those 
motions were self-serving and egotistical. There was no attempt to create a collective 
sense of ethical values and behaviors throughout the entire organization. The operational 
culture reflected blind loyalty and obedience. The fact that few employees had 
ownership, decision-making, or even budgeting or hiring/firing authority left most 
executives powerless and without a sense of what was going on behind the family’s 
closed doors. This void was filled with a sense of frustration and sometimes 
befuddlement. As one executive commented, “This was the strangest culture I ever saw. 
There is almost no way to describe it” (Exec I).  
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As these executives reflected on their time at Adelphia, many of them reported 
believing there was no shared moral sensitivity and character even within the family, 
something essential for an ethical organizational climate (Arnaud, 2010; Mayer et al., 
2010). According to those interviewed, no one could recall a written or expressed set of 
values or an ethical code of conduct that was a core part of the culture and that was 
enforced by management through both words and actions. Everything was decided by the 
family on an as-needed basis, with very little consistency. As Exec H commented, “I do 
not recall a mission statement or anything like that. A values statement? I don’t 
remember anything at all.” Exec B responded in similar fashion, saying, “If there was a 
values statement I couldn’t tell you what it was. If there was something, we may have 
been shown it the day we joined, but it was never seen again” (Exec B). Exec D gave a 
more elaborate explanation: 
I actually tried to put together [a mission and values document] for them when I 
joined. I had worked on one at [a former company]. [Instead] they would say that 
everything is a “case by case basis” and refused to lock in specifics. And there 
was never a cohesiveness among the family on this. (Exec D)  
No documents related to company values were found in my research. However when the 
new management team was hired to take the company through bankruptcy, after the 
Rigases were in jail, one of the first things they did was create a values statement for the 
firm going forward. 
The culture of an organization is, by definition, the way the executives perceive it 
to be, and the leadership, style of management, and the actual form of the company (in 
this case, a family-run company) all influence that perception (Victor & Cullen, 1988). 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, “the single most important determinant of an organization’s 
climate is the day-to-day behavior of the leaders of the organization” (Stringer, 2002, p. 
12). In this case, the research showed the behavior of the Rigas family was controlling, 
secretive, and entitled. Because activities were conducted behind closed doors, no 
obvious unethical behavior trickled down outside the core family and the few indicted 
members of the finance group. What did trickle down was a sense of frustration. At the 
same time, the executives saw the generous side of the family, as well as some odd 
management of the company, but no one interviewed suspected the extreme extent of 
fraud that was really going on. 
One of the most interesting findings is how the employees were kept at arm’s 
length from the leadership in terms of any business decisions. Tension definitely 
appeared in the organization as a result of the employees’ inability to understand 
management reasoning on issues affecting operations. The controlling pattern of “just do 
what the family says” made it difficult for employees to experience job satisfaction. But 
very few of the executives at this level left the company. This could have been because 
the company was highly regarded by the overall cable industry and was growing and 
seemingly doing well, and also because it was remotely located. Being in Coudersport 
made it difficult to actively seek another job. One of the former executives interviewed 
said: 
Fundamentally this was John [Rigas’s] company, and I don’t think he could ever, 
ever let go of that. He saw it as, you know, his personal company…that he built 
and owned. . . . [Several executives] expressed concern about the family control 
and being able to make decisions. . . . There was a lot of frustration. (Exec F)  
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 The low empowerment in the culture could easily have supported and facilitated 
moral disengagement by the leaders of the company. Parboteeah et al. (2010) stated that 
lack of empowerment and poor communication are common and important threads that 
run through past corporate scandals. The ability of members of the management team to 
empower themselves to make all decisions allowed them to decide who was and was not 
entitled to special care and assistance within the company and within the community. 
Helping some of the neediest individuals allowed the family to convince themselves they 
were doing good works and to excuse the self-serving nature of their actions and the 
financial implications of what they were doing—a perfect example of moral 
disengagement.  
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 was, “How were employees drawn into supporting, ignoring, 
or initiating unethical behavior?” A notable finding is the insistence that there was no 
knowledge of the fraudulent financial inner workings of the company, and the blind 
obedience that allowed them to support the unethical behavior without even really 
knowing what they were supporting. Although some employees did mention that they 
questioned how businesses were co-mingled, or how bills were paid, everyone seemed 
afraid or unwilling to raise questions with management. Although none of these people 
were found complicit in any of the fraudulent activities, a question arises about why no 
one took action. At the time, the general laxity of enforcement of white-collar crime, and 
the fact that examples were not being made of it to any major extent before Enron and 
Adelphia, may have contributed to the ease with which unethical behavior took place. 
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The leadership of Adelphia was able to make unethical decisions without fear of 
action or questioning on the part of the employees, and to draw the employees in by 
demanding unquestioning loyalty. The research shows the culture was a dichotomy of 
care on the one hand and entitlement on the other, and employees unwittingly 
participated through their blind obedience. Employees knew only that they were to do as 
they were told. As one former executive interviewed for this study remarked, “The 
Rigases were generally nice people but there were times that, if they said, “Jump,” you 
were supposed to say, “How high?” (Exec C)  
With no empowerment for decision making at Adelphia, very little budget 
control, lack of general company knowledge, and demands from management to take 
operational actions without any empirical business reasoning, employees were left to 
blindly obey the family in charge. This behavior was, in this case, a perilous and 
pervasive outcome of the culture of the firm and the moral disengagement of the 
management team.  
What kept these executives working for the Rigas family? There were a few 
reasons. One, they all worked in Coudersport, Pennsylvania, a secluded—almost 
isolated—small town where there was no possibility of other work. Adelphia was the 
primary game in town. If these former executives had chosen to leave the company, they 
would have had to relocate their families and find a job outside of that area. Two, the 
Rigas family continued to be kind and caring in many ways. They had company outings 
and events, cared for employees who were ill, and helped with housing for some of those 
who needed it. It was hard to believe a family that did those things would be doing 
anything that might destroy the company they worked so hard to build, and the reputation 
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they had achieved. Finally, Adelphia was considered a major player in the cable 
television arena and was well respected at the time. A job with a company on the cutting 
edge of the telecommunications industry was a secure job, and rarely was anyone ever 
fired from Adelphia. Perhaps it was easier for employees to simply put their head down 
and obey than to speak up and cause a storm over what was probably not a major issue 
anyway. Other than the few people indicted, no one knew how major the issue really was. 
The data give a clear picture of the culture and leadership style at Adelphia, and 
explain how fraud was able to happen. The stories of the executives revealed inside 
details of the company and the family which supplied additional landscape and context to 
the core details of the situation. There would certainly be opportunity to do further 
research from a psychological perspective on the patterns of behaviors of executives who 
commit fraud.  
Limitations of the Study  
No limitations beyond those discussed in Chapter 1 arose during this study. I 
found the participants to be forthright and open in their interviews; they seemed almost 
anxious to participate and share their experiences. One limitation known prior to the 
study was the inability to interview the incarcerated family members. Obtaining 
permission to interview prisoners is difficult in the best of circumstances and requires a 
lengthy IRB process. In this case, John Rigas is now 90 years old and in poor health. 
Interviewing him would have required permission from him personally as well as another 
family member whose location was not known. The point of view of the accused and 
convicted might have added another dimension to the study, but would have posed 
another difficult limitation—that of honesty—because the Rigases who are in prison 
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continue to ask, from time to time, consideration for early release, and have not yet 
admitted to any wrongdoing (Gilliland, 2012).  
Based on the conversations with the executives who were interviewed, it is 
difficult to speculate on what Tim and John Rigas would say in answer to the research 
questions, and because I was unable to interview them, I relied on the perceptions of 
those reporting to them. One executive suggested that the family, especially John, 
honestly believed this matter was all a misunderstanding, that there was nothing 
intentional done. There was also some suggestion that John Rigas, as the head of the 
family, was aging, and may not have been totally aware of how his son, Tim, was running 
the finance department. But most people disputed that possibility. One former executive 
interviewed as part of this study said, 
The John Rigas I knew was sharp as a tack. He could remember 
everything on my to-do list, even though I met with him maybe once a week. He 
could rattle it off in his head. I would joke with him and ask how he had such a 
memory, and he said “I used to work in a fast food restaurant. I know everything 
that’s going on.” (Exec D) 
Recommendations for Future Study 
The findings in this study present numerous opportunities to look behind the 
scenes of corporate fraud from a cultural standpoint. Learning about culture and 
leadership style directly from the people who were there will give future researchers an 
opportunity to analyze how certain characteristics of a culture may be ripe for, or even, in 
some cases, encourage fraud. Six suggestions come to mind for further research.  
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Change the Methodology or Research Design 
 A study on culture and leadership in companies experiencing fraud might benefit 
from another research design. Perhaps that study might focus more on the phenomenon of 
corruption. Such research might benefit from a different methodology. This same study 
might be conducted from another angle, such as that of corruption or fraud. In both cases, 
surveys of executives could also be used instead of interviews, or in addition to 
interviews. 
Interview Incarcerated Executives 
 I had hoped to interview the incarcerated executives of Adelphia to gain insight 
into their perspectives of the events that transpired that led up to their convictions. The 
difficulties of IRB approval might be lessened if the jailed executives are not elderly, and 
have no serious health issues, as was the case with Adelphia. Perhaps other researchers 
conducting similar studies will fare better in terms of the age and health of jailed 
executives. 
Research Companies after Fraud is Detected to Capture Lessons Learned  
 Adelphia is not the only company with a leader convicted of fraud. Some 
companies, like Tyco, experienced fraud and the CEO was incarcerated, but the company 
survived and still exists. Further lessons could be learned about what changes the board 
of directors made to survive and thrive beyond the fraud. 
Company Location and Relevance to Fraud 
Adelphia was located in a rural, isolated environment. Very few other major 
businesses were located nearby beyond Adelphia. The Rigas family not only ran the 
company, but also ruled the community of Coudersport, Pennsylvania. The importance of 
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a business to its community and the power of the business in the community was beyond 
the scope of this study, but could prove an interesting topic. Is it a positive or not that a 
company and its management are so intermingled with the community? Does corporate 
fraud occur more often in small towns or in major cities? 
Corruption in Family-Owned Businesses 
 Adelphia was a family-owned private operation that became a family-run public 
corporation. A question worthy of investigation is whether a leadership team of family 
members is more likely to work together to commit or overlook fraud? Is moral 
disengagement more likely to occur when there is a blood bond in the team? Looking at 
family majority ownership in publicly traded companies that have experienced fraud 
might reveal new insights as to whether a family team as majority shareholder in a public 
company is more likely to be enticed to engage in illegal activity. Also, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (n.d.) included a set of guidelines for boards, holding the members 
personally responsible for some financial oversight. Analysis of companies experiencing 
corporate fraud since 2002 might show a different approach to allowing family members 
in multiple management roles and on the board. 
Investigate Ethical Climate in the Cable Television Industry 
 It was common, in the early days of the cable television industry, for these 
operations to be family-run businesses; as such, the cable television industry could be an 
interesting one to explore in this regard. Cablevision Systems, Comcast Corporation, 
Century Communications, as well as Adelphia, all started as family-run businesses. 
Comcast is currently the largest cable operator in the United States, is a publicly traded 
company, and is still run by the son of the original founder. A study of the ethical climate 
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and management team at Comcast might show stark contrasts to Adelphia, particularly in 
empowerment versus control, and management egoism. 
Implications for Social Change 
This exploratory case study spotlighted one company and provided a plausible 
explanation for the contributing factors that led to perpetration of fraud at Adelphia 
Communications. The findings and explanation promote the view that ethical climate and 
moral disengagement are related to ethical behavior, and, in some cases, could lay the 
groundwork for fraud and other misdeeds to occur. The study tells a story in the words of 
those who worked within the company, and who did so in close proximity to members of 
the Rigas family. It provides an opportunity to replicate the study with other corporations 
to find consistencies as well as new elements of unethical behavior in corporations. 
The study shines a light on the cracks in corporate culture and leadership through 
stories told by executives about the leadership team rather than through financial 
statements and analysis. Financial analysis of Adelphia books proved the fraud, which is 
not questioned, but the executives who participated in this study told the story behind the 
fraud and provided a plausible explanation that allowed the fraud to take hold and 
continue for years.  
Importantly, neither the SEC nor outside counsel or auditors required changes in 
the reports being generated for shareholders. The board of directors, which was also 
family controlled, was not a team properly created for good oversight. The collapse of 
Adelphia occurred before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated, and is a case that 
exhibits the need for proper controls and oversights that this legislation arguably put in 
place. In fact, it is possible that this kind of “cloaked” fraud by family 
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management/ownership could not easily happen today under Sarbanes Oxley. Replicating 
this study by interviewing executives in other firms that have had ethical lapses will only 
add to the body of knowledge, possibly building a database of stories regarding 
leadership style and culture that most support or hide unethical decisions. 
In addition, further work may corroborate the lack of outside oversight at the 
time, and add to the research showing a need for strict accountability on the part of 
outside consultants. The opportunity exists to strengthen formal and informal reporting 
laws. Sarbanes-Oxley was a start, but there has been little real difference in corporate 
fraudulent behavior. While Dodd Frank did put new rules and oversight into effect for 
financial corporations, there continues to be a laxity in white-collar criminal enforcement 
(Cohan, 2015), and this laxity might begin to be addressed through future studies that 
prove and even demand a need.  
Internally, the culture of an organization should encourage ethical behavior, not 
open the door to fraud (VanSandt et al., 2006). Further studies such as this one will help 
organizational leadership understand the importance of creating programs to manage and 
promote an ethical climate. Procedures should be in place in every company to strengthen 
ethical culture. These procedures could include value statements, ethical codes, hotlines 
for whistleblowers, and ethical training and education. Boards of directors can learn how 
to best serve their organizations by understanding the importance of the actual 
management of ethical culture, not just ethical codes and ethical leaders. As VanSandt et 
al. (2006) remarked, “A fundamental commitment to high ethical standards must 
permeate everything employees do and must be a foundation of action of leaders 
throughout the organization” (p. 417). The effort of leadership to provide a conscious and 
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positive ethical environment at work will not only improve and strengthen ethical 
judgment in the organizations, but also in the individual executives, and in turn in the 
communities they serve (Duh et al., 2010). 
Conclusions 
As the researcher, this study allowed me to realize that there is no more 
straightforward way to hear about and understand the strengths and flaws of an 
organization than by talking directly to its executives. I sought an explanation for the 
collapse of a successful company, a reason behind ethical lapses in the decision making 
of the leaders of this once-heralded company. The findings of this exploratory case study 
show the continuing need to better understand the reasons behind ethical collapse, not 
just the fact that there was one. Additionally, the findings show the need to promote 
committed attention to the development and management of ethics training toward a 
moral workplace run by leaders who walk the talk on a daily basis 
Corporate fraud continues to flourish in American business (Barsky, 2011, Potter, 
2015). Thousands of white-collar criminals elude prosecution for every one convicted. 
According to Potter (2015), “We are in the midst of a white-collar and corporate crime 
epidemic” (p. 30). This study revealed that the words of the executives at the firm during 
the perpetration of the fraud can provide insights to the enablers of an ethical collapse. 
Moral leadership and ethical culture, as perceived the employees in the organization, are 
critical to the well-being of that organization (Arnaud, 2010; Gebler, 2006; Mayer et al., 
2010; Parboteeah et al., 2010). Who better to take the temperature of the firm, and to 
report the effect on the temperature, than those who are there? The more we understand 
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how unethical decisions affect others, the more chance we have to live collectively in a 
trustworthy and ethical social community. 
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire  
Overview of Employment (Background to establish credibility, work expectations, and 
prepare for questions on Culture) 
 
1. When did you join Adelphia Communications? 
2. How long did you work there? 
3. What was your title when you joined, and how did it evolve or the time you were 
there? 
4. Who did you report to in each job you held (by name and title)? 
5. Why did you join the company? Name two or three things that attracted you to work 
there. 
 
The Collapse (to answer Research Question 1 on why the collapse happened) 
 
6. Explain how you become aware that there was a financial investigation going on at 
Adelphia. 
7. Why and when did you ultimately leave the company? 
8. Describe your relationship with the top executive team and whether it changed over 
time. 
 
Business Environment/Culture (to answer Research Question 2 on the ethical culture at 
Adelphia) 
 
9. Describe if and how the owners made an effort to build a good place for employees to 
work. 
10. Was there a set of Company values or a Mission statement, and if so, how were those 
integrated into your day to day work by the organization?  
11. Describe how the company promoted collaboration among departments? 
12. Explain the type of training, if any, that the company provided on a regular basis 
(skills based, sales, ethics, human resource counseling, etc.). 
13. How would you describe the culture of the firm during your time there? 
14. Explain whether and how the culture and feeling of the firm changed over time. 
15. If you had direct access to the senior leaders of the firm, how would you describe the 
closest interaction you had on a regular basis (phone calls, personal meetings, staff 
meetings, company outings, etc)? 
 
Morality/Ethics/Opinions (to answer Research Question 3 on how employees were drawn 
in to accepting or ignoring unethical behavior) 
 
16. Describe how decision making was done in your department and whether you felt you 
had a share in it.  Describe any autonomous decision making authority you may have 
had. 
17. Explain how the P&L and budgets for your department were managed.   
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18. Describe how you felt about the morals and ethics of the company at the time you 
joined? Did this change and if so how? 
19. Describe the family that owned the company as you knew them, including their 
concern for employees. If you feel they were an upstanding family, explain what you 
saw in them that made you feel this way, and if you feel they were not, explain why. 
20. In your opinion, describe any change in the culture and morals at Adelphia during 
your time there. 
21. Explain in your own words why you feel Adelphia collapsed. 
 
Closing 
 
22. If you were writing the book, tell me in a few sentences what happened at this 
company. 
23. If there is a lesson to learn for you personally, what is it? 
24. If there is a lesson for corporate America, what is it? 
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Appendix C: Adelphia History Timeline 
The rise and fall of Adelphia Communications and its founding family, the Rigases, is 
highlighted along the following timeline. 
1924: John Rigas is born in Wellsville, NY.  
1943: John Rigas graduates high school and is drafted into the Army. He serves in World 
War II in Belgium, France, and Austria. 
1946: John Rigas is discharged as private first class and enrolls in Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute in Troy, NY. 
1950: John Rigas graduates with a degree in management engineering. Returns to 
Wellsville to work in the family restaurant and, later, a Sylvania plant. 
1951: John Rigas pays $72,000 for a run-down movie theater in Coudersport, PA. 
1952: John Rigas pays $300 for a local cable franchise in Coudersport, PA.  
1953: John Rigas marries Doris Nielsen, who that year gives birth to Michael Rigas. 
1954: John Rigas’s brother, Gus, joins the franchise.  
1956: Timothy Rigas is born. 
1972: The company incorporates as Adelphia, from the Greek for brother. 
1983: John Rigas buys out Gus’s stake as his three sons join Adelphia. 
1986: Adelphia goes public. 
1994: John Rigas pays $22 million for Buffalo Sabres stake. 
1999: John Rigas has triple heart bypass and later is diagnosed with bladder cancer. That 
year, he pays $8.5 billion for Century Communications, FrontierVision Partners, and 
Harron Communications, nearly doubling the size of the original Adelphia and making it 
the No. 6 cable operator at the time. The acquisitions add greatly to the debt of Adelphia. 
2000: John Rigas backs an office tower in Buffalo, NY, and buys control of the Sabres. 
2001: John Rigas is inducted into the Cable Television Hall of Fame. 
 
2002: In March, Adelphia discloses it provided collateral for $2.3 billion in loans to the 
Rigases. In May, as the stock plummets amid reports of financial scandal, Rigas and his 
family are forced out of the company. In June, Adelphia files for bankruptcy-court 
protection. In July, five executives — including John, Michael and Timothy — are 
arrested on charges of fraud. One pleads guilty and cooperates; the Rigases and Michael 
Mulcahey choose to go to trial. 
 
(http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/2004-07-09-rigas-timeline_x.htm) 
